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ABSTRACT
Until very recently, a great deal of confusion existed among courts
regarding the correct standard to apply in granting preliminary injunctions,
particularly in copyright-infringement lawsuits. While two recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions have at least begun to clarify the proper approach, the myriad
methods of analyzing the separate factors of the Court's test-as well as the
Ninth Circuit's persistence in applying its own alternative formulation-make it
difficult for lawyers and litigants to predict outcomes.
This Article begins by detailing the potential harms that arise from
applying an overbroad preliminary-injunction standard. It then seeks to
demonstrate that the Court's proffered test for granting such relief, which
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate each of four individual factors, should be
applied uniformly by lower courts deciding copyright preliminary-injunction
requests. Through a close examination of recent Supreme Court precedent, I
posit that the Court is attempting two primary aims: (1) raising the bar for
copyright plaintiffs requesting preliminary injunctions, in order to reduce the
irreparable harms inflicted by the current, overly lenient standard; and (2)
drawing the four-factor test into the "traditional contours" of copyright law, in an
attempt to stave off potential conflict between copyright protections and the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
Unfortunately, the Court has been vague on how lower courts should apply
its new standard in order to achieve these ends. As to the first, I argue that the
presumptions that formerly governed copyright preliminary injunctions should
be discarded. I then address the question of whether the Court's approach can
sufficiently account for free-speech concerns, particularly the potential-raised
persuasively by Professors Lemley and Volokh-that the prior-restraint doctrine
should apply to copyright law. I argue in response that, despite the theoretical
appeal of this argument, the Court's traditional-contours approach is a practical
reality. Thus, the question becomes how best to serve the interests of both the
First Amendment and copyright law while operating within the framework
currently governing copyright-preliminary-injunction jurisprudence. I contend
that free-speech concerns may be mitigated through careful application of the
Court's new four-factor standard for granting preliminary injunctions,
particularly under the public-interest inquiry dictated by the new standard. I
conclude by setting forth a factor-by-factor analysis of how the standard should
be applied in order to raise the bar faced by copyright plaintiffs and preserve
copyright's constitutionality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There stands a great divide between the rhetoric surrounding preliminary
injunctions and the practical reality they inhabit. In copyright-infringement
lawsuits, perhaps above all others, this rift is startlingly evident. On the one
hand, courts continue to pay lip service to the oft-repeated maxim that
preliminary injunctive relief is an "extraordinary remedy," best used sparingly
if at all.' The reality, however, is that such injunctions are handed down to
copyright plaintiffs almost as of right, upon a mere showing of some likelihood
that they will later succeed in proving infringement at trial.
Such divides between rhetoric and reality are common in the law,2 and
many are entirely benign. This one is not. The coercive nature of preliminary
injunctive relief alone should make judges wary to employ it. If issued
erroneously, a preliminary injunction carries the perverse potential of irreparably
harming parties-the very evil it was designed to prevent. Yet, because decisions
regarding such relief are interlocutory, they are generally made on an
undeveloped factual record, heightening the probability of erroneous judgments.
Furthermore, multiple standards for granting preliminary injunctions, and myriad
approaches to applying those standards, have emerged, plunging the entire
process into confusion. Perhaps most serious, however, is the possibility that
preliminary injunctions in copyright cases may be unconstitutional prior
restraints on speech-crushing the individuality and creativity of those accused
of copyright infringement.
The Supreme Court has recently cleared up some of this confusion, yet it
has left many questions unanswered. This Article attempts to answer some of
those questions by first filling in the gaps in the Court's holdings, then offering
guidance as to how lower courts should proceed in the future. Part 11 begins by
outlining the coercive nature of preliminary injunctions, as well as the potential
they carry for causing irreparable harms (and, conversely, irreparable benefits) to
litigants. Part Ill briefly examines the split between rhetoric and reality in
copyright preliminary injunctions; it concludes that the reality of preliminary
injunctions-at least in copyright-infringement suits-has become the polar
1 See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
2 See generally, e.g., Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of
Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 975 (2000); Marie Corcoran, Note, Rhetoric Versus
Reality: The Jurisdiction of Rape, the Indian Child Welfare Act, and the Struggle for Tribal Self-
Determination, 15 Win. & Mary J. Women & L. 415 (2009); Julianne Harper, Comment, Defining
Torture: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 893 (2009).
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opposite of the rhetorical ideal still espoused by courts. Part IV explores the
various standards courts employ in determining whether to grant injunctions,
including the "traditional" four-factor standard recently espoused by the Court.
Part V examines two recent Supreme Court decisions, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC and Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,4 and
begins to connect the logic of the two holdings. Part VI then posits that these two
holdings together evidence the Court's intention to pursue twin aims in its
copyright-injunction jurisprudence: (1) raising the bar for copyright plaintiffs by
enacting a more stringent standard, and (2) drawing the four-factor test into the
fold of copyright's "traditional contours" to forestall the possibility of copyright
preliminary injunctions being granted in violation of the First Amendment. As to
the first aim, I argue that courts should abandon the presumptions (both dejure
and de facto) that have essentially collapsed the standards for copyright
preliminary injunctions into one factor, likelihood of success on the merits. As to
the second aim, I begin by examining the argument, attributed largely to
Professors Lemley and Volokh, that copyright preliminary injunctions
frequently constitute prior restraints on speech, thus violating the First
Amendment. I maintain that, despite the theoretical appeal of this argument, the
Court's traditional-contours approach-and not direct First Amendment
scrutiny-is the practical reality dominating current copyright jurisprudence.
Such injunctions do, however, hold the potential to restrict freedom of speech.
Thus, I propose that, to preserve the constitutionality of copyright injunctions,
courts should apply a balancing-of-the-interests test under the "public interest"
prong of the four-factor standard. Part VI then concludes by analyzing how
courts should apply each of the four factors in turn, given the implications of the
Court's twin aims for future copyright-injunction jurisprudence.
II. "ENDING THE BALLGAME": THE COERCIVE NATURE OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
An "injunction" is a court order that commands or prevents a party to
perform or desist from performing some act,6 and a "preliminary injunction" is
an injunction of temporary duration that a trial judge issues either before or
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
4 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
s Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property
Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 150 (1998).
6 Black's Law Dictionary 800 (9th ed. 2009).
326
SPRING 2011 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW VOL.10:2
during a trial on the merits. What may not be apparent until entering actual
practice, however, is just how important these remedies are. The grant or denial
of a preliminary injunction is often the most crucial decision a trial judge can
make, one that has the frequent effect of completely ending litigation.! As Judge
Friendly declared, "Experience tells us how often the grant or denial of a
temporary injunction is the end of the ball game; the parties simply cannot await
the results of a full trial."9
This effect is due to the immensely powerful nature of the remedy itself.
District courts have wielded the force of preliminary injunctions in a broad swath
of scenarios, ranging from halting the U.S. Navy's use of sonar during training
exercises'o to ordering Bernard Madoff to cease all fraudulent activities related
to his infamous Ponzi scheme." In the realm of copyright law, preliminary
injunctions have banned a novel's publication and distribution, 12 prevented the
airing of a television broadcast,' 3 prohibited the displaying of a film,14 and
outlawed the performance of a play," all without the defendant being afforded a
full trial to determine the merits of the plaintiffs allegations. The enormous
power of injunctive relief, combined with the all-or-nothing stakes of a trial on
the merits, frequently forces preliminarily enjoined defendants to negotiate
settlements-even where they might have raised a meritorious defense at trial.' 6
In addition to a preliminary injunction's ability to command or restrain
conduct, it serves a "signaling" function, assisting the parties in reaching
settlement agreements. Because the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits
constitutes one factor of the court's decision whether to grant preliminary
See id. (defining "injunction" and "preliminary injunction").
86 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 22.7 (2007).
9 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 774 (1982); see also Winter,
129 S. Ct. at 381 ("Plaintiffs confirmed at oral argument that the preliminary injunction was 'the whole
ball game'....").
'n Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221-22 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
1 SEC v. Madoff, No. 08 Civ.-10791(LLS), 2009 WL 721712, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009). The
scheme, which allegedly defrauded investors out of some fifty billion dollars, may have been the
largest in history. See Thomas Zambito & Greg B. Smith, Feds Say Bernard Madoffs $50 Billion
Ponzi Scheme Was Worst Ever, NY Daily News, Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/nycrime/
2008/12/13/2008-12-13_fedssay bernardmadoffs_50 billionPonz.html.
12 E.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1576 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
1 Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14,26 (2d Cir. 1976).
14 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
Is Douglas Int'l Corp. v. Baker, 335 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
16 Patry, supra note 8, § 22.7.
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injunctive relief,n an interlocutory order either granting or denying an injunction
signals to the parties the court's initial view of the merits.' 8 By thus increasing
the amount of shared information the parties bring to the bargaining table, an
order regarding the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction often
facilitates settlement"-again ending litigation before a final judgment issues.
A. Preliminary Injunctive Reliefs Potential for
Inflicting Irreparable Harm
Although this signaling function can conserve the resources of both the
litigants and the court system by encouraging settlement, it becomes problematic
if the standard for granting preliminary injunctions is set either too low or too
high. As an initial matter, injunctions can issue "wrongfully. "20 A defendant is
wrongfully enjoined "when it turns out that [it] had the right all along to do what
21 22it was enjoined from doing."2' Conversely, a plaintiff is, at least in some cases,
wrongfully denied a preliminary injunction if she then successfully obtains (or
would have obtained) a permanent injunction at trial. In issuing preliminary
injunctive relief, then, "the task for the district judge ... is to minimize errors .... '
By producing such errors, a faulty standard for granting preliminary injunctions
creates the risk that a trial judge will send parties a false signal regarding her
perception of the strength of their respective cases.
If the standard applied by courts in deciding whether to grant preliminary
injunctive relief is too low, it will grant plaintiffs who would ultimately have lost
at a trial on the merits undeserved bargaining power-the shield becomes a
sword. Settlement negotiations present a bilateral monopoly; each party can deal
only with the other; there is no outside competition. 2 4 The "formidable,
17 See infra Part IV (outlining the various standards used by courts in granting preliminary injunctive
relief).
18 Patry, supra note 8, § 22.7.
19 Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 197, 202
n.14 (2003).
20 See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.06[A][6][c] (2006) (noting
that parties may be "wrongfully enjoined," thereby suffering harm).
Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 822 (1994).
22 Of course, in some cases, a plaintiff may simply fail to demonstrate some element required for
receiving preliminary injunctive relief; in such instances, it cannot be said that denial of her request
was "wrongful."
23 Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1984).
24 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.4, at 597 (7th ed. 2007).
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undeserved leverage" given to a plaintiff by an erroneous decision to grant a
plaintiff a preliminary injunction,2 5 in tandem with the economically isolated
nature of settlement negotiations,26 allows the plaintiff to exercise a form of
"market power"2 via a court-sanctioned monopoly. If, on the other hand, the
standard is too high, it will unduly discourage plaintiffs whose claims are
meritorious from pursuing a final verdict at trial.
Even if a single standard for granting preliminary injunctions were clearly
correct and universally applied, erroneous rulings would produce similarly
flawed results in at least some cases. While a certain degree of judicial error is
present in any decision-judges are only human, after all-the peculiar
circumstances presented by a request for a preliminary injunction exacerbate the
risk of error in a given case. Typically, having been presented with only an
incomplete record, courts are called upon to assess the strength of the plaintiffs
case, that is, the probability that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail at a trial on
the merits. In fact, a court may be forced to hold the evidentiary hearing on a
request for a preliminary injunction only one day after the plaintiffs filing of the
initial complaint.28 And at the farthest end of the "incomplete record" spectrum,
courts may grant preliminary injunctions without even holding an evidentiary
hearing.29 Error costs arise where the trial court rules wrongly.30 Posner argues
25 Patry, supra note 8, § 22.7.
26 Posner, supra note 24, at 597 ("The plaintiff can settle only with the defendant and the defendant
only with the plaintiff, and each party is eager to engross as much as possible of the surplus that
settlement will generate over litigation.").
27 "Market power" generally refers to the ability of a producer to set prices above marginal costs.
Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice 40-41 (2004). A monopolist exerts
maximum market power, allowing it to raise prices far above marginal costs, to the detriment of
consumers. Id. at 41. I use the term here to describe the ability ofa plaintiff with a weak case who has
nevertheless been awarded a preliminary injunction to secure a settlement in excess of what she would
have otherwise received.
28 See Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 84 (2007). In Sole, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction
to prevent the Florida Department of Environmental Protection from enforcing a "Bathing Suit Rule"
requiring patrons of Florida parks "to wear, at a minimum, a thong and if female, a bikini top." Id. at
78. By necessity, the trial court had held a preliminary-injunction hearing only one day after the
plaintiffs filed their complaint, a time-frame that (naturally) did not allow for discovery, proper
document review, or presentation of witnesses. Id. at 84. While this example falls at the far end of the
spectrum, it certainly lays bare the potential for judicial error that can arise when a judge is asked to
assess the plaintiff's probability for success while the record remains undeveloped.
29 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[A][6][a], at 14-152 ("An evidentiary hearing is not
necessarily required prior to granting a preliminary injunction, if the required facts are established by
affidavit or deposition.").
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that judges contemplating whether to award preliminary injunctive relief can
reduce these error costs by comparing the ratios of each party's likelihood of
success to the amount of irreparable harm each can be expected to suffer.3 1 All
loss-minimization techniques aside, however, "[b]ecause the judge is being
asked to rule in a hurry, on the basis of incomplete information, the risk of error
is great."32
By definition, wrongfully denying a preliminary injunction-whether
caused by application of an incorrect standard or by judicial error-likely causes
an irreparable harm to the plaintiff.33 This is so because, to receive a preliminary
injunction, a plaintiff must show likelihood that she will suffer irreparable harm
absent interim relief, at least in a jurisdiction that does not presume such harm. 3 4
In any event, the likelihood of irreparable harm nominally exists. If the judge
does, in fact, wrongly deny the requested relief, it follows that the plaintiff will
probably suffer an irreparable injury as a result. The inverse is also true, at least
in some cases.3 ' Take, for example, one possibility noted above-the plaintiff
wrongfully receives a preliminary injunction, and the resulting leverage allows
her to force the defendant to enter into an unfair settlement agreement. Since the
case will never go to trial, the resulting harm to the defendant will not be
remedied; it too is "irreparable." 36
B. Preliminary Injunctive Relief's Potential for Imparting
Irreparable (and Undeserved) Benefits
Professor Lichtman identifies the frequently overlooked flip side of this
dynamic: both irreparable harms and "irreparable benefits" (essentially,
undeserved windfalls) arise in each erroneous decision regarding a preliminary
3o Posner, supra note 24, § 21.1, at 593.
3 Id. § 21.3, at 595-96. This approach places judges in the unfortunate position of having to affix
value to harms that are, by definition, "irreparable."
32 Id. § 21.3, at 596.
3 Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 116 Yale L.J. 1284, 1289-90 (2007). As used here,
"wrongful" denotes either (1) denying an injunction to a plaintiff who would have ultimately prevailed
at a trial on the merits and received a permanent injunction, or (2) granting an injunction to a plaintiff
who would not have prevailed at trial.
34 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) ("A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.").
Lichtman, supra note 33, at 1290 ("[A] wrongful injunction might irreversibly harm the defendant in
a distributional sense . . . .").
36 See id. (noting the possibility of erroneous injunctions causing irreparable harm to defendants).
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injunction. 7 If, for example, the trial court were to wrongfully deny a plaintiff a
preliminary injunction, that single decision would cause not only an irreparable
harm to the plaintiff, but also an irreparable benefit to the copyright-infringing
defendant. 3s Again, the inverse is also true. Unfortunately, despite recent efforts
toward clarification by the Supreme Court,39 the current standard for granting
preliminary injunctions in copyright-infringement suits remains unclear.40
C. A Tale of Two Remedies
Given the uncertain standard, the high potential for judicial error, and the
irreparable nature of the harms and benefits that can arise from wrongful
decisions, the rhetoric surrounding preliminary injunctions is unsurprising. "A
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right," 41
runs the familiar invective. "[It] is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden
of persuasion." 4 2 This characterization is no recent development-as early as
1824, the Court began to identify injunctions as "extraordinary" remedies.4 3
Judge Baldwin may have summarized the depiction most eloquently, stating:
"There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater
caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or is more dangerous in a doubtful
case, than the issuing of a preliminary injunction.""
Within the realm of copyright law, the rhetoric is much the same-more
than one court adjudicating a copyright-infringement suit has referred to the
preliminary injunction as "one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial
" Id. at 1289-90.
3 See id.
E.g., Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375-76; eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
40 Compare Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying a two-factor
standard for granting preliminary injunctions), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 587 F.3d 966,
973-74 (9th Cir. 2009) (four-factor standard).
41 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376; accord Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2219 (2008).
42 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting I I A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, at
129-30 (2d ed. 1995)).
43 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 802 (1824) ("Mere general principles, upon
which Courts of equity may have proceeded a certain length in interposing by injunction, will not
warrant the extending this extraordinary remedy still further.").
4 Bonapart v. R.R. Co., I Baldw. 205.
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remedies."4 5 "The preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy," courts
opine, one that "will be granted only if the movant has clearly carried the burden
. . .. 6 The Supreme Court avers that it "has consistently rejected invitations to
replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed." 47 The
preliminary injunction of copyright-law rhetoric is a powerful tool, an
"extraordinary remedy," wielded with caution by judges to protect only those
few plaintiffs who can successfully clear the many hurdles along the way. It is
somewhat akin to one of Plato's "Forms,"48 a perfect, otherworldly exemplar, of
which only flawed representations exist in reality.
In reality, an entirely different remedy exists-the relatively humble,
physical manifestation of the ideal. Unlike its dignified cousin, the preliminary
injunction is "pretty much granted as a matter of course" in intellectual-property
disputes across the United States.4 9 Although courts continue to repeat the
"extraordinary remedy" mantra in describing preliminary injunctions, "their
issuance is actually quite ordinary, even commonplace," in actual copyright
litigation. so This practice stands in stark contrast to the lofty preliminary
injunction idolized in rhetoric, a device "which is at best used sparingly, if at
all."5'
Such a divergence between rhetoric and reality did not always exist.
Historical research reveals that early American courts refused to grant
52preliminary injunctions in many, if not most, copyright-infringement cases.
Thus, for example, when a court made a statement to the effect that "[a]
4 Berlent v. Focus Features, LLC, No. 06 Civ. 2834(SCR), 2006 WL 1594478, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June
8, 2006) (quoting Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
46 Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1462 (5th Cir. 1990); Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985).
47 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006).
48 Plato described his conception of the existence of Forms in, among other works, The Republic. See
2 The Dialogues of Plato 431 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1907) ("[A]ll the poets ... are only imitators;
they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach[.]"). His Forms occupied the
perfect reality and were far superior to the material representations with which we interact empirically.
See id.
4 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 233.
5o Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[A], at 14-141.
5 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1523 n.l (D. Colo. 1995). The court
based this premise on its observation that the "emergency nature" of a preliminary injunction does not
allow for the "careful consideration afforded by the deliberative processes of a trial." Id.
52 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 154-55.
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preliminary injunction will not be awarded except in a plain case," the trial
judge was rarely indulging in mere rhetoric-he often did not issue the
injunction. On the contrary, when granting preliminary injunctive relief to
copyright plaintiffs, courts exercised great caution-with some frequency, it
seems, courts would refer cases to special masters to provide a more developed
analysis of the merits of plaintiffs' claims.55 Merely demonstrating a likelihood
of success on the merits was not enough for a copyright plaintiff to receive a
preliminary injunction, whereas that showing may be all that a modem district
court requires-even if the non-moving party has raised a plausible defense." In
fact, some modem courts have twisted this standard so as to require only a
"better than negligible chance" of success, 8 a requirement that can sometimes be
satisfied even where the court finds that the plaintiff is "very unlikely" to
succeed at trial.59 In short, the reality is that preliminary injunctions-at least in
copyright-infringement suits-have become the polar opposite of the rhetorical
ideal still espoused by courts.
s3 Harper v. Holman, 84 F. 224, 225 (C.C. Pa. 1897).
54 See, e.g., id. (C.C. Pa. 1897) (refusing to grant a preliminary injunction on a theory of copyright-
infringement).
5s See, e.g., Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 172 (1847) (enjoining defendants' "abridgement" of,
ironically, Justice Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence); Story v. Derby, 23 F. Cas. 171,
171 (1846) (describing the use of a special master in a similar case). It should be noted that using a
special master is not unheard-of in modem copyright suits. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix
Control Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow trial judges discretion in appointing special masters).
56 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at I56 ("Early American copyright plaintiffs also faced
substantial burdens in demonstrating that the balance of hardships favored an injunction, even when
success on the merits was likely.").
s7 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[A], at 14-133.
5 E.g., QRSoft, Inc. v. Rest. Tech., Inc., No. 06 C 2734, 2006 WL 2990432, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19,
2006). The Seventh Circuit nominally appears to be moving toward a standard that would require a
plaintiff to show a "reasonable likelihood of success on the merits." Id.; see also Coronado v.
Valleyview Pub. Sch. Dist. 365-U, 537 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2008) ("A party seeking a
preliminary injunction must demonstrate that he is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits . . . .").
However, it may still apply the (arguably) lower standard by simply defining a "reasonable likelihood"
as "better than negligible." E.g., QRSoft, Inc. v. Rest. Tech., Inc., No. 06 C 2734, 2006 WL 2990432,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2006). Furthermore, the better-than-negligible standard is still very much
alive. See, e.g., Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the United States of America,
Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1100 (7th Cir. 2008).
" Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at I100.
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Ill. THE STANDARDS FOR GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN
MODERN COPYRIGHT LAW
An in-depth exploration of the diverse approaches used by modem courts
in determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in copyright cases
would present no small task. Thankfully, it is one that has largely been
undertaken by quite able scholars,60 and a smaller-than-treatise-sized summary
will serve here. The variety displayed in the standards applied by courts, as well
as the assortment of modifications made to individual factors within those
standards, demonstrates the urgent need for a clear standard-and clear direction
on how to apply that standard. And as with any solution, the first step is
identifying the problem.
A. The Collapsible Tests of the Second and Ninth Circuits
Broadly speaking, in the Second Circuit and (usually) the Ninth Circuit,
courts have considered three common factors in determining whether to grant
preliminary injunctive relief to a copyright holder: (1) the likelihood of her
success on the merits, (2) whether she has demonstrated that she will suffer an
irreparable harm absent interim relief, and (3) whether the "balance of
hardships" tips in her favor.61 Neither Circuit's approach creates an absolute
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.62
Both offer plaintiffs who cannot do so the option of showing the existence of
"serious questions" going to the merits.63 Beyond that, however, the two Circuits
diverge.
1. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's formulation of the standard for whether to grant a
6o Goldstein, Nimmer, and Patry each provide thorough-and, to a degree, different-views on the
current approaches used by the various circuits and the Supreme Court. Compare 2 Paul Goldstein,
Goldstein on Copyright § 13.1.2.2 (3d ed. 2008) (containing perhaps the least editorializing of the
three), and Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[AI[2], at 14-133 (identifying the two-factor test
as predominant), with Patty, supra note 8, § 22.15, at 22-54 ("The two-factor standard is not, however,
the dominant standard as [Nimmer] asserts.").
Goldstein, supra note 60, § 13.1.2.2, at 13:12. For an example from each circuit, see Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2007), and MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown
Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2004).
62 Compare, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2004) (identifying the
Second Circuit's formulation), with, e.g., LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d
1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating the Ninth Circuit's test).
63 Compare sources cited, supra note 62.
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preliminary injunction is as follows:
[A] court may issue a preliminary injunction in a copyright case only if
the plaintiff has demonstrated "either (a) a likelihood of success on the
merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in the [plaintiff's] favor." Second, the court may issue the
injunction only if the plaintiff has demonstrated "that he is likely to
suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction." . . . Third, a
court must consider the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant and issue the injunction only if the balance of hardships tips
in the plaintiffs favor. Finally, the court must ensure that the "public
interest would not be disserved" by the issuance of a preliminary
64injunction.
Thus, copyright plaintiffs must essentially demonstrate four things: (1)
likely irreparable harm, (2) a likelihood of success or "serious questions" and a
"decidedly" favorable balance of hardships, (3) a favorable balance of hardships,
and (4) a favorable public-interest inquiry.
a. Irreparable Harm
Today, the Second Circuit test requires a copyright plaintiff to demonstrate,
at an irreducible minimum, that she will likely suffer irreparable harm absent
preliminary injunctive relief. Until quite recently, however, the Second Circuit
had followed the view that, where a copyright plaintiff can make a prima facie
case of infringement, courts should generally presume irreparable harm.65 In the
preliminary-injunction context, a showing of likely success on the merits
sufficed to give rise to this presumption.66 Given this dynamic, the "requirement"
of showing irreparable harm essentially collapsed into the likelihood-of-success
alternative.6 7 The only adverse consequence faced by plaintiffs who failed to
demonstrate irreparable harm was foreclosure of the confusing and rarely
invoked serious-questions-and-balance-of-hardships option.
Salinger v. Colting, decided April 30, 2010, finally explicitly rejected the
presumption-of-irreparable-harm approach formerly applied the Second Circuit.
6 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (alteration in original)
(quoting multiple Second Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court opinions).
65 Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 2002).
6 Id.
67 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[A][2][c], at 14-137.
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Judge Calabresi, applying Supreme Court precedent (namely, eBay and Winter),
firmly stated that, when faced with a request for a preliminary injunction, "[t]he
court must not adopt a 'categorical' or 'general' rule or presume that the plaintiff
will suffer irreparable harm."68
b. Likelihood of Success
Under the Second Circuit's pre-Salinger approach, the importance of this
factor was paramount-a copyright plaintiff who could satisfy the likelihood-of-
success prong was essentially guaranteed a preliminary injunction. In the
copyright context, demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits requires a
plaintiff to prove that it holds a valid copyright and that the defendant
infringed.6 As in an actual trial, the defendant can defeat such a showing by
raising a defense-for example, that the fair use doctrine protected their
copying. 70 Exactly how likely is a "likelihood" of success? Courts are
remarkably reticent on the subject. When a standard is elucidated, it is generally
of little value; a "substantial" likelihood appears to be higher than a negligible
one, but still allows plenty of room for the existence of disputed facts and
plausible defenses.7' The few courts who have dared to elaborate have fixed a
"likelihood" at "better than fifty percent," 72 a measure that appears to negatively
impact plaintiffs' typically high chances of receiving a preliminary
injunction-73 except in the copyright context. 7 4
68 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 80.
69 NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2004).
7o Id.
n See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-Am., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 141 (D.N.J. 1982)
("Acknowledgement that disputed fact issues exist does not preclude a court from granting a plaintiff
preliminary [sic] relief. Similarly, the existence of a plausible defense in a copyright case is no barrier
to the issuance of a preliminary injunction as long as the movant shows a substantial likelihood of
success . . . ." (citation omitted)).
72 E.g., Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star,
Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
7 See Wali, 754 F.2d 1015 (denying a preliminary injunction to inmates who wished to receive copies
of reports on conditions at the Attica prison); BigStar Entm t, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185 (denying a
preliminary injunction to halt alleged trademark infringement). But see Esbin & Alter, LLP v.
Zappier, No. 08 Civ. 313, 2010 WL 391830, at *2, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2010) (setting the standard at
fifty percent, yet granting a preliminary injunction to a copyright plaintiff).
74 See Esbin, 2010 WL 391830.
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c. Serious Questions and the Balance of Hardships
Despite nominally applying eBay and Winter in full force to requests for
preliminary injunctive relief in copyright cases, the Second Circuit's Salinger
opinion still identified the "serious-questions" prong as an alternative to showing
a likelihood of success.75 At best, this holding is puzzling; at worst, it is
incomprehensible. In both eBay and Winter, the Court clearly mandated the
application of the "traditional" four-factor standard-without so much as
76
mentioning the "serious-questions" inquiry.
Regardless of whether applying it is wrong as a matter of precedent, this
alternative to demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits has been
roundly criticized. The definition of "sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation" 1 is enormously vague. It can be
safely said that mere "generalized assertions" are not sufficiently serious to meet
this standard.7 ' Furthermore, the sufficiently-serious-questions standard suggests
something less than a likelihood; if it were the equivalent, it would not be an
alternative.8 0 It follows that the plaintiff may demonstrate a lower-than-fifty-
percent chance of success (the highest percentage courts are willing to assign to
"likelihood"), yet still show sufficiently serious questions." Beyond that,
attempts to pin down the standard are futile. This is, of course, problematic, for
"[i]t becomes rather difficult for anyone to form a reasonable expectation as to
what will constitute a serious question in the eyes of the judges in the Second
Circuit."8 2
75 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010).
76 See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (stating the four
factors).
n See, e.g., Patry, supra note 8, § 22.16, at 22-58 ("[I]t is past time for the court of appeals to abandon
its test."); Linz Audain, Of Posner, and Newton, and Twenty-First Century Law: An Economic and
Statistical Analysis of the Posner Rule for Granting Preliminary Injunctions, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1215, 1237-38 (1990) ("Perhaps the most obvious difficulty with this standard is that literally an
infinite number of 'factors' are subsumed within a 'serious question."').
78 Coming Inc. v. Picvue Elec., Ltd., 98 F. App'x 39, 40 (2d Cir. 2004).
7 Wireless TV Studios, Inc. v. Digital Dispatch Sys., Inc., No. 07 CV 5103(RJD)(RER), 2008 WL
2474626, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) (denying a preliminary injunction to a copyright plaintiff
who failed to demonstrate either likelihood of success or the existence of sufficiently serious
questions).
so Audain, supra note 77, at 1238 n.126.
81 See id.; cf. Esbin & Alter, LLP v. Zappier, No. 08 Civ. 313, 2010 WL 391830, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
4, 2010) (granting preliminary injunction to copyright plaintiff).
82 Audain, supra note 77, at 1238.
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The second half of this alternative requires a copyright plaintiff to
demonstrate that the balance of hardships tips "decidedly" in her favor.83
Undoubtedly due in large part to the uncertainty and apparently de minimis
standard of the serious-questions prong, the analysis tends to collapse into this
balance-of-hardships inquiry-courts may mention "serious questions" by rote,
but tend to skip straight to the balance of hardships when a plaintiff fails to show
a likelihood of success. 84 Courts at least occasionally invoke the balance of
hardships to deny preliminary injunctions in copyright cases, but such
occurrences are rare.
d. The Public Interest
In the past, the Second Circuit generally ignored the public's interest in
granting injunctive relief. The Salinger decision in 2010, however, at least
nominally requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a favorable public interest in order
to receive a preliminary injunction. Given that "the public's interest has not in
the past been a formal factor in [the Second Circuit's] standard for when to issue
copyright injunctions," 87 it remains to be seen how this factor will be applied.
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit's approach is similar to, yet arguably even more
problematic than, the test used by the Second Circuit. It requires the plaintiff to
show "either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and the
balance of hardships tilt in the plaintiffs favor."88 Immediately, it is apparent
8 E.g., Lapham v. Porach, No. 06-Civ-6861 (CM), 2007 WL 1224924, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
2007); Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Ottoman's v. Sunshine State Labs., No. 92 CIV. 5386 (JES), 1992 WL 212473, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 1992).
See, e.g., Lapham, 2007 WL 1224924, at *1 ("Because, on the record before the court, plaintiff has
not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits, or that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in
plaintiffs favor, plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction is denied."); Ottoman's, 1992 WL
212473, at *I ("[E]ven assuming arguendo that there are fair grounds to litigate the merits . . . plaintiff
has not shown that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiff's favor.").
E.g., Ottoman's, 1992 WL 212473, at *1. In Ottoman's, the district court held that, where both
parties participated in trade shows, the hardships were, at best, equal-the potential harm to the
plaintiff caused by denying the injunction was balanced by the harm that would be caused to the
defendants by granting it. Id.
8 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[A], at 129-30.
8 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 80 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010).
8 Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003).
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that a plaintiff need not demonstrate even the possibility of irreparable harm to
receive a preliminary injunction, although such harm is the traditional touchstone
for injunctive relief.89
Further complicating matters is the Ninth Circuit's tendency to treat the
first half of its formulation as a "sliding scale."90 As such, the higher the
probability of success a plaintiff could demonstrate, the lower the degree of
irreparable harm she was required to show, and vice versa.91 Coupled with the
presumption of irreparable harm that the Ninth Circuit recognizes upon a
showing of likely success, 9 2 the opposite ends of this continuum present
untenable possibilities. A plaintiff could show a high likelihood of success on the
merits, creating a presumption of irreparable harm, and thereby collapse the
inquiry into a single factor. Conversely, a plaintiff could show a great deal of
irreparable harm and be granted an injunction where she shows only a negligible
likelihood of success, 93 calling into question the sources and nature of the harm
itself-the very predicate upon which the grant of the injunction is (or should
be 9 4) based. How minimal a showing of likely success can still satisfy the
sliding-scale standard is unclear-must success be "probable?"95  Only
"reasonable?" 96 The upshot of the flexibility built into the very structure of this
test, exacerbated by the lack of workable definitions for its various requirements,
is that district court judges in the Ninth Circuit have traditionally exercised
nearly unbridled discretion in granting preliminary injunctions to copyright
plaintiffs.
8 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959) ("The basis of injunctive relief in
the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.").
9 E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).
91 See, e.g., id.
9 E.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1999); Micro Star v.
Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998).
9 See Patry, supra note 8, § 22.20, at 22-63 (citing Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.
2005), and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001), as examples of
such a scenario).
94 Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-07.
95 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007) (identifying the
standard as "probable success on the merits" (quoting A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1013 (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
96 See Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp., No. 99-15048, 1999 WL 561261, at *1 (9th Cir.
1999). The court stated that "[i]n a copyright case, if aplaintiff can establish a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits, irreparable harm is presumed." Id. Since, as noted above, the presumption
would collapse the nominally two-part analysis, a "reasonable" likelihood of success would be enough
for a preliminary injunction to issue in such a case.
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B. The "Traditional" Four-Factor Standard
Arguably the most widely used standard in modem copyright lawsuits, 9 7
the four-factor test requires courts to consider: (1) the plaintiffs likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) the likelihood that she will suffer irreparable harm
absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of hardships to the parties, and (4) the
public interest.9 Even the circuits that apply these factors vastly diverge in how
they do so,9 and, in general, confusion and disorder have run rampant. 1o The
foundational question of whether a plaintiff is required to demonstrate all four
factors or whether the entire test (or some portion thereof) consists of a balancing
act has been met with a variety of answers.'0' In addressing the likelihood-of-
success factor, most circuits recognize a presumption of irreparable harm upon a
showing of likelihood of success-yet the Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected
this view.102 As to the question of how likely a "likelihood" must be, the Seventh
Circuit currently requires only a "better than negligible" chance of success.'o3
The Eighth Circuit recently toyed with a standard that is, if possible, equally
esoteric: requiring plaintiffs to show a "fair chance" that they will succeed.
" See Patry, supra note 8, § 22.21, at 22-64 (stating that the four-factor test is "used by the Supreme
Court and all circuits other than the Second and Ninth . . . ."). But see Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note
20, § 14.06[A], at 14-133, 135 (referring to the Ninth Circuit's formulation as "the predominant test").
9 See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (stating the four
factors as independent requirements).
' See Patry, supra note 8, §§ 22.22-31 (surveying the various methods of application among the
circuits); see generally Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 173 (1984) (arguing for a clearer standard for granting general-law preliminary
injunctions).
100 See generally Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Each
party is able to cite numerous decisions in support of its view of the proper standard, simply because
the relevant case law is in disarray in both this and other circuits.").
'o1 See Goldstein, supra note 60, § 13.1.2, at 13:14-15 ("Most courts treat the first three factors ... as
variable and interrelated."); Patry, supra note 8, § 22.21, at 22-65 ("[B]eyond shared use of the same
factors, application and weighing of [the factors] varies importantly among the circuits .... ).
102 E.g., Plains Cotton Co-op. Ass'n of Lubbock, Tex. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d
1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the presumption of irreparable injury).
103 See, e.g., Lineback v. Spurlino Materials, LLC, 546 F.3d 491, 502-3 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d 1559, 1568 (7th Cir. 1996) (espousing better-than-negligible
standard); Sofinet v. 1.N.S., 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Roland, 749 F.2d at 387) (stating
that, although there is "a minimum threshold for likelihood of success ... it is a low one").
Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Univ. of Tex.
v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). But see Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
530 F.3d 724, 731-32 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)
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Even among courts that nominally require a plaintiff to demonstrate all
four factors to receive a preliminary injunction, the "individual" factors have
often collapsed. The Fourth Circuit, for example, holds that where a plaintiff
demonstrates irreparable harm and a favorable balance of hardships, the
likelihood-of-success requirement defaults to a serious-questions standard.'os As
noted above, this standard is of little practical import. Fourth Circuit courts
admit as much, stating that only where "the balance of hardships is substantially
equal" does "the probability of success begin[] to assume real significance."' 07
The Seventh Circuit's better-than-negligible standard is particularly problematic.
The defendant typically has a better-than-negligible chance of succeeding, or
else she would have settled the case as soon as possible rather than incurring
litigation costs. Plaintiffs who have only a negligible chance of winning at trial
would very rarely bring suit in the first place. Thus, in nearly every case, both
parties could presumably satisfy this requirement, rendering the standard largely
superfluous. What is worse, by creating an artificial incentive for such plaintiffs
to bring suits seeking preliminary injunctions-which, if awarded, give plaintiffs
a powerful bargaining chip-such a standard needlessly creates excess
litigation'0 and runs the risk of irreparably harming defendants.'09
Generally speaking, the multiple factors tend to be subsumed into the
likelihood-of-success requirement. As noted above, nearly all the circuits
adopted a presumption of irreparable harm in cases where a copyright plaintiff
has shown a likelihood of success.'IS The presumption is at least nominally
rebuttable.'" Where, for instance, a defendant demonstrates that the plaintiffs
copyright-protected product is "no longer on the market," at least one court has
held the presumption to have been overcome.'1 This result makes perfect sense,
given the obvious lack of harm that would accrue to such a plaintiff before the
(enacting a "more rigorous standard" requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are "likely to prevail
on the merits").
tos Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2002) (trademark case).
1o6 Id.
107 Id. at 271 (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 808 (4th Cir.
1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
1os Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[A], at 14-130 n. 36.9.
" Id.
Ito Id.
111 See, e.g., Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1997) (giving
examples of situations in which defendants could rebut the presumption).
112 Marisa Christina, Inc. v. Bernard Chaus, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 356, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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conclusion of a full trial on the merits." 3
In the typical copyright case, however, the presumption essentially folds
irreparable harm into likelihood of success, leading at least one court to note that
there is "no need actually to prove irreparable harm when seeking an injunction
against copyright infringement."ll 4 The same could generally be said regarding
the public-interest prong. The official party line is that "the public interest is the
interest in upholding copyright protections."" 5 As a result, it has unsurprisingly
become "virtually axiomatic" that copyright plaintiffs who have demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits have also satisfied the public-interest
inquiry." 6 The argument is summarized thus:
Since Congress has elected to grant certain exclusive rights to the owner of
a copyright in a protected work, it is virtually axiomatic that the public interest
can only be served by upholding copyright protections . . . . Preliminary
injunctions are necessary to preserve the integrity of the copyright laws which
seek to encourage individual effort and creativity by granting valuable
enforceable rights." 7
Similarly, courts that use the four-factor test typically hold that the balance
of hardships-at first blush a separate requirement-is linked to a plaintiffs
satisfying the likelihood-of-success factor," 8 although this approach is not
universal. In the Fourth Circuit, balance of hardships sometimes appears to be a
threshold factor, one which must be satisfied before the court will even consider
"3 Other such situations to which courts have pointed are frequently less logically coherent, one
notable example being cases where a copyright plaintiff delayed unreasonably in bringing suit after
learning of the alleged infringement. E.g., Forry, Inc. v. Neundorfer, Inc., 837 F.2d 259, 267 (6th Cir.
1988) ("It has been held that an unreasonable delay between the time when a plaintiff is first apprised
of the infringing acts and the time of filing suit will rebut the presumption of irreparable harm.").
These examples often crumple under closer scrutiny, however, as does the Forry court's-neither case
the court cites to support its statement actually held the presumption to be rebutted.
114 Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F2d 600, 612 (1st Cir. 1988).
" Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 968 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Autoskill, Inc. v. Nat'l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1499 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
116 See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1255 (3d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Concrete Mach., 843 F.2d at 612 (same).
17 Shaw Bros. Co. v. Foxcard Inc., No. 3:03 CV-783-R, 2004 WL 2055845 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 16, 2004)
(citations omitted).
" Goldstein, supra note 60, § 13.1.2, at 13:22.
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likelihood of success." 9 Emphasizing the balance of hardships is, however, the
exception, not the rule. Thus, the favorable balance of hardships, public interest,
and irreparable harm standards tend to be quite low, if not illusory. If it is
possible to distill a general principle from this patchwork of precedent, it is that
copyright plaintiffs who have demonstrated some degree of probability of
success at trial have, for all practical purposes, satisfied all the prongs of the
four-factor test and will therefore receive preliminary injunctive relief.
IV. THE COURT WEIGHS IN: EBAY, WINTER, AND A MEASURE OF CLARITY
In the past, the Supreme Court has not been particularly helpful in clearing
up the confusion surrounding preliminary injunctions in copyright cases.120
Illustrative is one three-year period, from 1973 to 1975, in which the Court
wavered between at least four different standards.121 Outside the copyright
context, the four factors gradually emerged as the relevant considerations,122 but
it remained somewhat unclear whether the plaintiff was required to demonstrate
each factor.123 In Weinberger, for instance, the Court referred to the balance-of-
hardships analysis as flexible-"the court 'balances the conveniences of the
parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the
granting or withholding of the injunction."' 24 The burden of demonstrating that
the public interests favored granting an injunction similarly did not seem to rest
119 E.g., Candle Factory, Inc. v. Trade Assoc. Group, Ltd., 23 F. App'x. 134, 137 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating that, in applying the four-factor test, courts must first balance the likelihood of harms to the
respective parties). Upon a demonstration of a favorable balance of harms, the standard for success is
lowered to the serious-questions level. Id. Outside the copyright context, Fourth Circuit courts have
explicitly identified the balance-of-hardships factor as the most important aspect of deciding whether
to grant preliminary injunctions. See Hughes Network Systems, Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp.,
17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The 'balance of hardships' reached by comparing the relevant
harms to the plaintiff and defendant is the most important determination, dictating, for example, how
strong a likelihood of success showing the plaintiff must make.").
120 See Audain, supra note 77, at 1234 ("Much of the responsibility for the existing variations in
preliminary injunction standards lies with the United States Supreme Court.").
121 See Wolf, supra note 99, at 182 (citing examples of the Court using two-, three-, and four-factor
tests within the stated three-year time period).
122 Compare Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83-84, n.53 (1974) (referring to the four factors
adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the case below as "the traditional standards
governing more orthodox 'stays'), with Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1982)
(considering four factors in granting a preliminary injunction).
123 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312-13.
124 Id. at 312 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)).
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on plaintiffs.12 5
Quite recently, however, the Court issued two decisions that may grant a
measure of clarity amidst the disarray. In 2006, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC
announced that a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction in a patent-
infringement case now bears the burden of demonstrating the four factors.126
Two years later, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Court
overturned the grant of a preliminary injunction forbidding the U.S. Navy from
using a certain form of sonar during training exercises.127 In doing so, the Court
broadly stated that plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions-like those seeking
permanent relief-must also demonstrate all four factors.128 At first glance, these
two cases present unlikely candidates for the task of clarifying the standard for
granting preliminary injunctive relief to copyright plaintiffs. Neither case
involved copyright infringement, and although eBay at least implicated
intellectual-property law, it dealt with a permanent (not preliminary)
injunction. 129 In neither case did the Court expressly state that the holdings apply
to copyright law, which has traditionally occupied a peculiar space in the arena
of equitable relief.130 As a result, no small amount of uncertainty yet remains as
to what impact these cases will or should have on copyright jurisprudence. An
examination of the Court's reasoning in eBay and Winter reveals that both do
hold.important implications for copyright law. Both, however, raise at least as
many questions as they answer.
A. On eBay, and Applying the Four Factors to Patent (and Copyright?)
Plaintiffs Seeking Permanent Injunctions
In eBay, the Court considered an appeal from a Federal Circuit decision
applying a "general rule" that, absent extraordinary circumstances, courts should
grant permanent injunctions to successful patent plaintiffs.' 3 1 Referring to the
125 See id. ("In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the
public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.").
126 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
127 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 382 (2008).
1' Id. at 374.
129 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
130 See generally 2 Jay Dratler, Jr., Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative, and Industrial
Property § 13.01, at 13-2.1 (2004) ("Injunctive relief is a crucial remedy for infringement of
intellectual property rights. The very foundation of intellectual property is exclusivity, and no amount
of money, by itself, can provide that exclusivity." (citation omitted)).
13 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (quoting MercExchange, LLC v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
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four-factor test for permanent injunctionsl32 as part of the "well-established
principles of equity," the Court held that it applies to patent-infringement suits. 33
The majority also clearly placed the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that
each of the four factors is met. 1 34 Upon those principles, the Court flatly rejected
the Federal Circuit's general rule that permanent injunctions nearly always
follow a showing of patent infringement.'3 5
Interestingly, the Court analogized to copyright law, resting heavily on the
questionable statement that its approach was consistent with the Court's repeated
rejection of a rule that injunctions should automatically issue to successful
copyright plaintiffs.'3 6 For support, the eBay majority looked to three cases: New
York Times Co. v. Tasini, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Co., and Dun v.
Lumbermen's Credit Association.1
The Tasini Court upheld the Second Circuit's grant of summary judgment
in favor of plaintiff-authors who sued several publishers, claiming that the
defendants allowed LEXIS/NEXIS to place their articles on its searchable
database in violation of copyright laws.'3 In doing so, the Court mentioned that
it did not follow from its decision that an injunction "must issue" in such cases
and remanded the case to the district court for resolution of all remedial
questions. 139
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, a seminal case for modem fair-use analysis, the
Court also (very) briefly discussed copyright injunctions. Campbell involved a
ribald 2 Live Crew parody that borrowed from Roy Orbison's relatively subdued
hit, "Oh, Pretty Woman." 4 0 Having found that the parody constituted fair use,
132 As formulated by the eBay Court, the test requires a plaintiff to show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant,
a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id.
133 Id. ("These familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.").
134 Id.
"3 Id. at 394 ("[Tlhe Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of [injunctive] relief.").
36 Id. at 392-93
'1 Id. at 392.
13 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 483-84 (2001).
1 Id. at 505-06.
'4 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994).
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the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 2 Live Crew.14' The
Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the commercial nature of the parody gave
rise to a presumption against a finding of fair use.142 Although the vast majority
of the Court's opinion devoted itself to the remedial question at bar-whether
summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate-the twenty-five-page
opinion also contained a footnote that briefly discussed copyright injunctions. 143
In it, the Court stated that "courts may .. . wish to bear in mind that the goals of
the copyright law . . . are not always best served by automatically granting
injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair
use."
Only the final case cited by the eBay Court, Dun v. Lumberman's Credit
Association, represents an instance in which the Court was faced with deciding
whether an injunction was an appropriate remedy in a copyright-infringement
lawsuit.14 5 In Dun, the publisher of a reference book containing the credit ratings
of thousands of merchants and manufacturers sued the publisher of a work with a
similar aim, although the defendant's book contained more detailed information
about a narrower range of businesses.146 The evidence suggested that the
defendant had infringed on a small amount of the plaintiffs copyrighted
material.147 Agreeing with the trial court that the nature of the infringed work and
the adverse consequences an injunction would inflict upon the defendants both
counseled against granting such relief, the Court "remitt[ed] the [plaintiffs] to a
court of law to recover such damage as they might there prove that they had
sustained." 48
Thus, the eBay Court's copyright analogy rests on unsteady ground. Dun
was decided in 1908, nearly one hundred years before eBay, yet it made no
mention of a four-factor test (or any test, for that matter). The equivocality and
narrow scope of the footnotel49 in Campbell-not to mention its status as pure
141 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1158-59 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
142 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436-37 (6th Cir. 1992).
143 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
144Id.
145 Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20, 21, 24 (1908).
t4 See id. at 21 ("The appellee is a corporation engaged in preparing and publishing a similar book,
limited, however, to those engaged in the lumber and kindred trades.").
147 Id. at 23.
148 Id. at 24.
1' Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n. 10, 600 ("[I]n cases involving parodies (or other critical works), courts
may also wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law . . . are not always best served by
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dicta in an opinion that did not otherwise mention injunctions-speak for
themselves. Finally, the brief mention in Tasini was perhaps even more confined,
and likewise appeared within a decision that was not addressing the question of
whether to grant injunctive relief.'so
Questionable precedent aside, however, the eBay Court was free to speak
for itself-and it did so, clearly stating that plaintiffs seeking permanent
injunctions must satisfy the four-factor test.15 It definitively held that patent
plaintiffs were subject to this requirement.152 Although not faced with a
copyright issue, the Court indicated that its holding was "consistent with [its]
treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act." 5 3 This discourse on copyright
law, unnecessary as it was to the discussion at hand, was also grounded on a
shaky premise. Why, then, the argument by analogy? It seems doubtful that the
Court's army of clerks merely got its history wrong, and even more improbable
that the Justices were blissfully unaware of the disorder surrounding copyright
injunctions. Rather, although faced directly with a patent-law dispute, the Court
appears to have taken the opportunity to attempt to clear up some of the
confusion in copyright law. By devoting a large portion of its opinion to the
copyright-law analogy, the eBay Court made fairly clear its belief that, as part of
the "well-established principles of equity," the four-factor test should apply in
copyright cases.15 4
The Court left unanswered several important questions, however, one being
whether the differences between preliminary and permanent injunctions are so
great that eBay's holding applies only to the latter. Although the Federal Circuit
decision on appeal in eBay had expressly noted that preliminary and permanent
injunctions "are distinct forms of equitable relief that have different prerequisites
and serve entirely different purposes," 5 5 the eBay Court failed to address this
distinction. Thus, assuming eBay, or at least its rationale, applies to copyright-
automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of
fair use." (citation omitted)).
15o See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
1s1 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
152 Id. ("These familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.").
'5' Id. at 392.
154 See id. at 391-93 (relying largely on an analogy to copyright law in holding that neither of the
lower courts applied the four-factor test correctly).
15s MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Lermer
Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Federal Circuit thereby rejected the lower court's reasoning that MercExchange's
failure to seek preliminary injunctive relief favored denying it a permanent injunction. Id.
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infringement suits, it remained unclear whether the four-factor test must be
satisfied by copyright plaintiffs seeking preliminary, rather than permanent,
injunctions. In 2008, the Court may have supplied the answer.
B. On Winter, and Applying the Four-Factor Test to
Preliminary Injunctions Generally
The factual and procedural history surrounding the Winter case is fairly
complex. Broadly speaking, the dispute involved a complaint filed by several
environmental groups against the U.S. Navy, alleging that the Navy's use of a
certain type of sonar was causing undue environmental disruption, particularly to
marine mammals. 15 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted a preliminary injunction against the Navy, finding that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated both a "probability of success" and "at least a possibility of
irreparable harm.""'8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred, twice
upholding the district court's determination that preliminary injunctive relief was
appropriate.'5 9 The Supreme Court, however, did not agree, flatly stating, "The
Court of Appeals was wrong, and its decision is reversed." 6 0
On the issue of whether the four-factor standard should be applied to
requests for preliminary injunctions, the Court was emphatic: "A plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
public interest."' 6 ' The Court further disagreed with the lower courts on how the
individual factors should apply, both generally and as to the case at bar.
With regards to the "possibility" standard for irreparable harm, the Winter
56 The Court itself admitted as much. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365,
371 (2008) ("The procedural history of this case is rather complicated.").
See id. at 371-74 (detailing at some length the attenuated path the Winter case took before finally
reaching the Supreme Court).
1ss Id. at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court in fact found that plaintiffs had
exceeded this low standard, having demonstrated that irreparable injury to the environment was nearly
certain. Id.
159 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
preliminary injunction was appropriate, but remanding to the district court with orders to more
narrowly tailor the scope of the injunction); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658,
703 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the revised injunction).
60 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 370.
61 Id. at 374.
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Court found it "too lenient" as a general matter.162 The Court stressed that a
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of demonstrating that
irreparable harm is "likely" absent injunctive relief,13 relying on the familiar
characterization of such relief as an "extraordinary remedy" for support." While
it was unclear whether applying the incorrect standard actually affected the lower
courts' decisions-particularly given their findings that the "plaintiffs had
established a 'near certainty' of irreparable'harm" 6 5 the Court ultimately rested
its decision elsewhere.
In applying the final two factors (balance of hardships and the public
interest) to the case at bar, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Winter majority,
found the lower courts' analysis to be lacking.I66 Having held that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that either factor favored granting a preliminary injunction,
the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion-and cautioned that the
lower court granting a permanent injunction on these facts would lead to the
same result. 6 7 Accordingly, the Winter Court did not reach the likelihood-of-
success-on-the-merits factor.168
Although a dispute over the effects of sonar usage on beaked whales and
bottlenose dolphins seems an unlikely source for guidance on copyright
injunctions, several relevant guidelines do emerge from Winter. Foremost is the
proposition that the four-factor test applies to cases involving preliminary, as
well as permanent, injunctions. The obvious objection is that, read narrowly, this
holding does not apply directly to copyright law-but be that as it may, the Court
expressly deigned to qualify its statement on the matter. Rather, the broad
162 Id. at 375 ("We agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit's 'possibility' standard is too lenient.").
63 Id. (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters,
415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
'6 See id at 375-76 ("Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm
is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.").
165 Id. at 376 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 696-97 (9th Cir. 2008).
See, e.g., id. at 377 ("In this case, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit significantly understated
the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the Navy's ability to conduct realistic training
exercises, and the injunction's consequent adverse impact on the public interest in national defense.");
id. at 378 ("Despite the importance of assessing the balance of equities and the public interest in
determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the District Court addressed these
considerations in only a cursory fashion.").
Id. at 381.
See id. ("While we have authority to proceed to such a decision at this point, doing so is not
necessary here." (citation omitted)).
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language used by the Court dictates that all plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief
bear the burden of demonstrating each of the four factors.169 Thus, in Winter's
wake, "[a] plaintiff' seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy the four-factor
test.no Given the Court's repeated statements that preliminary and permanent
injunctions are analyzed nearly identically,' 7' coupled with the eBay Court's
none-too-subtle analogizing to copyright law,I72 a promising baseline principle
appears:
The four-factor test should apply to copyright plaintiffs seeking
preliminary injunctions.
C. The New Reality-or at Least the Near Future-of Preliminary
Injunctions in Copyright-Infringement Claims
The reaction to eBay and Winter by lower courts subsequently adjudicating
copyright claims has been mixed at best, illustrating once again the discrepancies
and confusion that have become the hallmarks of copyright preliminary-
injunctive jurisprudence. A few courts appear to have taken the Court's
admonitions to heart, giving real teeth to the individual factors of the test set
forth in both eBay and Winter.'7 3 In the majority of copyright proceedings,
however, the effects have been disappointingly minimal.17 4 At least some courts
in the Ninth Circuit, for instance, have continued to apply the Circuit's two-
pronged test and its presumption of irreparable injury after eBay.175 Thus, it
169 Id. at 374.
170 Id.
"' See id. at 381-82 ("[O]ur analysis of the propriety of preliminary relief is applicable to any
permanent injunction as well."); id. at 381 (quoting Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell,
Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987)) ("The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the
same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of
success on the merits rather than actual success." (emphasis added)).
172 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006).
73 See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assoc., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007)
("Insofar as [Plaintiff] suggests that it is entitled to injunctive relief, we reject the argument." (citing
eBay, 547 U.S. 388)). In weighing the plaintiff's copyright-infringement claim and request for a
permanent injunction, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to analyze each of the four factors in turn, and
found that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that either the balance of hardships or the public
interest favored granting the injunction. Id. at 544.
174 See Jake Phillips, Note, eBay's Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When Property Rules Give Way to
Liability Rules, 24 Berk. Tech. L.J. 405, 420 (2009) (arguing that eBay's impact on copyright claims
has proven to be largely negligible).
17 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2007); Jacobsen v.
Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying Ninth Circuit law). But see, e.g., Summit Entm't,
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remains possible (depending on the particular district court chosen as venue) for
a copyright plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit to receive a preliminary injunction after
demonstrating only one of the four factors-likelihood of success on the
merits.'76 District courts in the Second Circuit have similarly failed to uniformly
adhere to the four-factor test.'77 In 2009, for example, J. D. Salinger brought suit
in the Southern District of New York, alleging copyright infringement of
Catcher in the Rye (195 1).178 Expressly distinguishing eBay on the grounds that
it's holding applied only to patent law'79 (and omitting entirely any reference to
LLC v. Beckett Media, LLC, No. CV 09-8161 PSG (MANx), 2010 WL 147958, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
12, 2010) ("A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.") (emphasis added)
(quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009))); cf.
Protectmarriage.com v. Courage Campaign, No. CIV. S-10-132 LKK/DAD, 2010 WL 3255571, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010) (applying the four-factor test in a trademark-infringement suit).
176 See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Cody, No. 1:08-cv-00590-LJO-SMS, 2009 WL 3650923, at *6
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009). The district court aptly (if unintentionally) demonstrated the vast disparity
between the two-pronged approaches and the four-factor test, stating:
Generally a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show either a
likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or
that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in its favor; however, because in a copyright
infringement claim a showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm, a plaintiff need only show a
likelihood of success on the merits to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Id. (citing Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998)). Notably, the opinion
ignores not only the clear holding of the Winter Court that the Ninth Circuit's "possibility of
irreparable injury" standard was too low, but also Ninth Circuit precedent recognizing Winter's
applicability to requests for preliminary injunctive relief. See Am. Trucking Ass ns, 559 F.3d at 1052
("[W]e must follow the Supreme Court's recent expatiation on the proper standard for granting or
denying [preliminary injunctions].") (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365
(2008)).
17 See, e.g., Esbin & Alter, LLP v. Zappier, No. 08 Civ. 313, 2010 WL 391830, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
4, 2010) (granting a preliminary injunction after applying the Second Circuit's test (discussed supra)).
78 Complaint at 4, Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d
Cir. 2010).
' See Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268 n.6 ("[eBay] dealt only with the presumption of irreparable
harm in the patent law context, and thus is not controlling in the absence of Second Circuit precedent
applying it in the copyright context.").
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Winter) the court granted Salinger's request for a preliminary injunction,'so using
the traditional Second Circuit test.1sl The Second Circuit, however, reversed on
appeal, holding instead that eBay applies equally to requests for preliminary
injunctive relief in copyright-infringement suits. 82
The Second Circuit's Salinger decision reflects the general trend among
federal courts dealing with requests for copyright preliminary injunctions toward
adopting the four-factor test espoused by the Court in eBay and Winter.183 Even
if district courts are not already legally bound by Supreme Court precedent to
apply the four-factor test to requests for copyright injunctions, they will likely be
so bound in the immediate future. The Court's apparently renewed interest in
elucidating a uniform standard for injunctive relief,18 4 coupled with its strong
indication in eBay that it does not consider the field of intellectual property to
constitute an exception to that standard, warrant the prediction that, when the
Court squarely faces the question, it will hold that copyright plaintiffs seeking
preliminary injunctions must demonstrate each of the four factors.
Setting aside for the moment the question of how well the four-factor test is
suited to addressing the practical and constitutional concerns raised by blanket
granting of preliminary copyright injunctions, the likelihood that the formerly
myriad approaches used by trial courts will continue to unify in the near future
should be viewed as a positive development. Similarly situated copyright
defendants will no longer be subjected to different standards depending upon
which jurisdiction they are hauled into-and conversely, copyright plaintiffs will
not be quite so encouraged to engage in forum-shopping.8 " At the same time,
applying one test will, at least theoretically, increase uniformity and
so Id. at 269.
Id. at 254. Thus, the district court (nominally) required Salinger to demonstrate irreparable harm
and either likelihood of success or "sufficiently serious questions" and "a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in [his] favor." Id. (quoting Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 331
F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003)).
182 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2010).
183 See Phillips, supra note 174, at 423 n.133 (noting that lower courts have, after eBay, applied
"traditional equitable principles"-i.e., the four-factor test-in 71.4% of all copyright-infringement
cases).
14 See generally Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
18 Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) ("These familiar principles apply
with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.").
1 Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 428 (2004) (referring to the prevention of forum-shopping
as an "important purpose" of a rule requiring prisoners to file habeas claims in the district wherein
they are incarcerated).
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predictability across the circuits. Since an efficient market requires all
participants to have perfect information, uncertainty necessarily breeds
inefficiencies; thus, increasing predictability will reduce the deadweight losses
inflicted on society by uncertainty.' Beyond the socioeconomic advantages
inherent in any uniformly applied standard, by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate
each of the factors-in contrast to the alternative-factor structure of the Second
and Ninth Circuit formulations-the four-factor test also seems to present a
better framework for reducing the frequency with which courts dispense
preliminary injunctions in copyright-infringement lawsuits. Given the potential
for irreparable harm caused by the overbroad granting of preliminary injunctions,
such a reduction should be viewed positively.
Unfortunately, even the four-factor standard is sufficiently murky that it
allows courts to issue injunctions upon a relatively minimal showing by
copyright plaintiffs. The burden-shifting presumptions discussed supra have not
disappeared, and they can give rise-even after eBay and Winter-to bizarre
applications of the test. Summit Entertainment, a trademark- and copyright-
infringement suit filed in the Central District of California, provides a striking
example of the confused logic now employed by some district courts:
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely
to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest. Plaintiff need only establish a
likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright and trademark claims to
support the requested injunction. 18
These two sentences cannot coexist; they present a facially apparent
cognitive dissonance. Only by employing the Orwellian concept of doublethink,
whereby one may simultaneously accept two mutually contradictory premises as
17 These twin aims represent one of the highest goals of an efficient legal system. See Lassiter v.
Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 50 (1981) (referring to "the predictability and
uniformity that underlie our society's commitment to the rule of law").
188 Cf. Robert John Grubb II, Note, Attorneys, Accountants, and Bankers, Oh My! Primary Liability
for Secondary Actors in the Wake of Stoneridge, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 275, 304 (2009) ("Certainty and
predictability would be the hallmarks of such a unitary standard, and national uniformity would
increase economic efficiency . . . .").
1 Summit Entm't, LLC v. Beckett Media, LLC, No. CV 90-8161 PSG (MANx), 2010 WL 147958, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046,
1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and headings omitted)).
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correct,' 90 could this passage emerge as a coherent statement. Again we see the
divide between rhetoric and reality-the district court ostensibly recognized the
holding of Winter as applying to copyright law (the first sentence is, in fact, a
direct quote from the Winter majority), yet it immediately reverts to a collapsed,
single-factor analysis, appearing to dismiss the possibility that the Court's Winter
ruling holds any real-world implications for copyright claims.
Thus, while it seems likely that in the near future, courts in all circuits
faced with copyright plaintiffs' requests for preliminary injunctions will
nominally shift to applying the four-factor test, it seems equally unlikely that this
shift will affect the outcome of more than a few isolated cases. Was this the
Court's only goal-to force the circuits into uniformly applying (or at least
paying lip service to) one test for preliminary injunctions? While a national
standard would certainly hold at least some social benefits,' 9' recall the eBay
Court's core holding-that a "general rule" that an injunction should issue
following a finding of patent infringement is inappropriatel 9 2 -as well as its
statement rejecting such a rule in copyright law.19 3 Recall also the Winter Court's
rejection of the Ninth Circuit's "possibility of irreparable harm" standard in
favor of the more stringent "probability" now required. 194 An ideal beyond all
federal courts merely paying lip service to uniform application of the four-factor
standard is at play in these decisions, though it is not-as the confusion among
subsequent district-court rulings demonstrates-readily apparent. Understanding
the Court's aims requires stepping back for a moment to survey the broader
scope of copyright jurisprudence.
V. WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON HERE? THE TWIN AIMS OF THE COURT'S NEW
COPYRIGHT-PRELIMINARY-INJUNCTION JURISPRUDENCE
The commonplace granting-almost as a matter of right-of preliminary
injunctions in copyright-infringement suits is problematic in multiple regards.
The likelihood of an undeveloped factual record present in requests for
1 George Orwell, 1984 214 (Signet Classic 1950) (1949) ("Doublethink means the power of holding
two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.") (emphasis
original).
191 See supra notes 184, 187 and accompanying text.
192 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
19 Id. at 392-93.
19 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 (2008) ("We agree with the
Navy that the Ninth Circuit's 'possibility' standard is too lenient.").
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preliminary injunctive relief uniquely exacerbates the risk of judicial error. 9 5
The negligible standard for granting such relief almost certainly grants
"formidable, undeserved leverage" to copyright plaintiffs.'" Defendants are thus
made to suffer irreparable harm, a cruel irony given that the very purpose of
preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent such harm. While the split between
rhetoric and reality is problematic in itself, as any such duplicity reduces respect
for the judicial system and the rule of law, this conceptual divide also produces
these more tangible societal costs. Surveying the landscape of decisions, the
feeling is almost instinctive that something is broken-we (as well as,
presumably, the Court) recognize the pitfalls of universally granting preliminary
injunctions, yet their wholesale issuance continues.
Unfortunate as they might be, the inefficiencies and inequities produced by
the current over-generous standard might not represent its most pernicious
effects. The First Amendment's deep distrust of prior restraints on speech may
pose a more serious problem. Since copyright infringement often concurrently
exists as an individual's speech, instances of infringement would seem, at least
in some cases, to warrant protection under the First Amendment. In the realm of
preliminary injunctions, this possibility is doubly apparent-no concept is more
central to free-speech jurisprudence than that prior restraints on speech are
generally inconsistent with First Amendment freedoms. 9
These two distinctly problematic areas, I posit, are what the Court
attempted to target with its recent holdings addressing the proper standard for
preliminary injunctive relief. The mandated use of the four-factor test, coupled
with laying the burden of proving each factor squarely on the plaintiffs
shoulders, addresses the first grouping of problems by raising the bar for
plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions. The public-interest inquiry under the
four-factor standard holds the potential for addressing the First Amendment
concerns implicated by the second.
A. Raising the Bar: The Four-Factor Test as a More Stringent Standard
The Court's adoption of the four-factor test essentially erects higher and
more numerous hurdles for copyright plaintiffs who request preliminary
injunctive relief to clear. As noted above, the commonality of the approaches
used by the Second and Ninth Circuits-in which a vastly disproportionate
195 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
' See Patry, supra note 8, § 22.7.
' See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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number of copyright lawsuits are initiated' -is that neither approach creates an
absolute requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits;199 instead, both offer copyright plaintiffs who cannot do so the option of
showing merely the existence of "serious questions" going to the merits.2 0 0 Both
offer prongs with alternatives, rather than strict requirements, so that although
both standards do contemplate three individual factors, neither requires plaintiffs
to demonstrate all three.20' Given the presumption of irreparable harm still
applied in the Ninth Circuit, even the remaining two factors may essentially
collapse into one-a far cry from the four factors copyright plaintiffs are (at least
nominally) required to demonstrate under the Court's newly adopted test.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's standard does not require plaintiffs to
202demonstrate that the public interest favors granting a preliminary injunction, a
deficiency discussed in greater detail infra.20 3 Thus, it can safely be said that the
four-factor test-which, at least on its face, requires a plaintiff to separately
demonstrate each of the four factors-increases the number of obstacles in the
path of a copyright plaintiff. Whether its application (given the framework in
which it currently operates) will result in fewer preliminary injunctions actually
being issued is a more questionable proposition.204
In both eBay and Winter, however, the Court strove to alter not only the
test used, but also the accompanying framework within which lower courts apply
it. The eBay majority flatly rejected the notion that an injunction "automatically
follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed," 2 0 5 calling into
serious question the continuing legitimacy of the presumption of irreparable
1A recent WestLaw search for "copyright /s infring! /p complaint" yielded 3,257 hits from the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C. and Federal Circuits combined. The
same search yields 2,750 results from the Second and Ninth Circuits alone-thus, under this
(admittedly) crude methodology, nearly 46% of all copyright-infringement lawsuits are brought in
those two circuits.
Compare, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2004) (identifying the
Second Circuit's formulation), with, e.g., LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d
1150, 1155 (stating the Ninth Circuit's test).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
204 Id.
205 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006).
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harm. Commentators have been equivocal on the question, 206 although to the
extent a general trend in scholarship may be derived, the tendency seems to be to
view eBay as peacefully coexisting with the presumption.2 07 Until Salinger in the
Second Circuit, no Circuit Court had squarely addressed the issue;20 s district
courts have been divided.2 0 9 Taken by itself, the eBay Court's repeated emphasis
on the plaintiff bearing the burden of establishing each of the four factors 210
militates in favor of the view that, if it has not already done so, the Court would
(given the opportunity) overrule the presumption of irreparable harm in both
patent and copyright law. 2 1 1 When the Winter opinion is taken into account,
however, the argument becomes even stronger-there, the Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit's possibility-of-irreparable-harm standard, 212 making it clear that it
envisions the heavier burden of proving a "probability" of harm as being placed
squarely on the shoulders of plaintiffs. 2 1 3
Although the possibility has attracted less attention, eBay (and, to a degree,
Winter) also cast considerable doubt on courts' traditional practice of essentially
206 E.g., Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit's Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural
Matters in Patent Cases, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 643, 670 n.205 (2009) (citing various commentators
on the issue); Edward D. Manzo, 7 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 44, 51 (2007) (identifying a split
among district courts on whether the presumption of irreparable harm survived eBay).
207 See, e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 505, 578-82 (2010)
(noting that the Court "has elsewhere made clear that courts can apply presumptions in favor of a party
who bears the burden of persuasion," and arguing that "the case for pro-injunction presumptions is
substantial"); see also Ho-Sung Chung, Note, The Supreme Court Unjustly Declares Open Season on
Patent Dealers, 2009 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 227, 247 (2009) ("[W]hen district courts go through the
first eBay factor (irreparable harm), they can-and should-apply the presumption of irreparable harm
unless the infringer can prove otherwise."); Miranda Jones, Note, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy by
Any Other Name Is Patently Not the Same: How eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent Right of
Non-Practicing Entities, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1035, 1065 (2007) (arguing that "[slince Court in
eBay did not disturb [the] foundation for the presumption of irreparable harm, it should still stand").
208 The Eleventh Circuit came close to deciding the question in ruling on a lower court's grant of a
preliminary injunction, albeit in the trademark context. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide,
Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1229 (11 th Cir. 2008) (remanding the question to the district court).
209 See generally Manzo, supra note 206, at 51 (detailing the post-eBay split).
210 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (stating that "a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction" must demonstrate
each of the four factors).
211 See generally Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 1/S: J.L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 67,
90-91 (2010) (arguing against the presumption of irreparable harm).
212 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 (2008).
213 Finally, as discussed infra, the supplementary requirement that courts measure the public interest in
each case further buttresses this argument.
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ignoring the balance-of-hardships and public-interest prongs. The logic of this
proposition is much the same as that for the demise of the irreparable-harm
presumption: the Court has evidenced its desire to end the widespread, almost
automatic, issuance of preliminary injunctions in intellectual-property cases.
Doing so requires not only additional, but also higher, hurdles-ones that will
not collapse upon a singular showing of likely success. Where courts have
analyzed the balance-of-hardships, they have generally dismissed the possibility
that, despite a plaintiffs showing of likely success on the merits, the balance of
hardships may tip in favor of denying the preliminary injunction.214 Thus, the
burden arguably does not currently rest on plaintiffs, and even if it nominally
does, it disappears upon a showing of likelihood of success. 215 Likewise, in the
rare event that courts devote any ink to the public-interest factor, they tend to
summarily dismiss the argument that granting a preliminary injunction would not
enhance the public interest by simply repeating that "the public interest is always
served by upholding copyrights . . . ."216 Since eBay and Winter counsel against
the automatic issuance of injunctions upon a showing of likely success, and in
support of requiring plaintiffs to actually demonstrate each of the four factors
individually,2 17 the Court appears to disapprove of the current copyright-law
framework surrounding both the balance-of-hardships and the public-interest
factors. The pre-eBay and Winter analytical structure created additional
presumptions as to these two factors that universally benefit copyright plaintiffs,
presumptions that should now find themselves out of favor.
Thus, it appears that the Court is attempting to effect a sea change in the
realm of preliminary injunctions-and particularly in the area of intellectual-
property injunctions-back toward the ideal that has, of late, existed only in
rhetoric. Recognizing the problems that uniquely inhere in overbroad granting of
preliminary injunctive relief, problems caused largely by the undeveloped factual
record upon which courts must operate in adjudicating such requests and the
214 See Goldstein, supra note 60, § 13.1.2(c) ("[M]ost courts connect balance of hardships to
probability of success on the merits . . . ."); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 20, § 14.06[A], at 14-129-
39 ("The second factor-balance of hardships-is also not usually invoked in copyright cases."
(citation omitted)).
215 Goldstein, supra note 60, § 13.1.2(c) ("[M]ost courts ... will usually tip the balance of hardships in
the plaintiffs favor to the extent that it has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.").
216 Janel Russell Designs, Inc. v. Mendelson & Assocs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 857, 861 (D. Minn.
2000); Signcad Tech. Corp. v. Signcad Systems, Inc., No. Civ. 02-4786(JRT/FLN), 2003 WL 465801,
at *6 (D. Minn. 2003).
217 See infra notes 210, 212 and accompanying text.
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highly coercive nature of the remedy itself, the Court has endeavored to re-raise
the bar. The four-factor test is, at least on its face, more conducive to achieving
this goal. Unfortunately, the framework in which courts apply the test largely
erodes any positive effects the transition to universal application of the four-
factor test may have otherwise had. 218 Admittedly, neither eBay nor Winter was
sufficiently clear on the question of how to apply the new test. The spirit of
both rulings, however, militates against continued application of the
presumptions that give rise to the collapsible-factor approach still used by some
courts in applying principles of equity to copyright law.
B. Prior Restraints and "Traditional Contours"
Although they may seem to agree on little else, modem legal scholars have
come to universally regard copyright law as fairly unique in that it regulates-
and, in many cases, stifles-what would otherwise be protected speech under the
First Amendment.220 This premise traces its roots to a seminal article published
218 Effects, that is, aside from the procedural benefits (e.g., reducing forum-shopping, creating at least
some degree of predictability and certainty) that tend to accrue from adopting a universal standard.
219 The Court, of course, seems to allude to the four-factor test as a "traditional" equitable principle.
Whether it was applied historically is a fairly doubtful proposition, but the Court very well may have
intended its nod to the "traditional" principles of equity to refer to the broader (and more established)
tenet that injunctive relief should be regarded an extraordinary remedy, to be granted rarely; under this
understanding, the more stringent standards of the four-factor test would seem to align more closely
with tradition.
220 For just a handful of the myriad works espousing this view, see Howard B. Abrams, Law of
Copyright § 1:21 (2009) ("Copyright ... does restrict any speech or other form of communication that
wishes to use the protected expression of copyrighted work without authority of the copyright
owner."); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 1126, 1151
(2009) (noting that, historically, "copyright has always suppressed some amount of speech . . . .");
Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 Hastings L.J. 1083, 1085
(2010) ("As copyright law prohibits more and more uses of copyrighted expression, it necessarily
encroaches upon the ability of others to express themselves through the use of copyrighted material.");
Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity: The Roadblock to Democracy?, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 799, 825 (2006) ("In
the marketplace of ideas, copyright can act to inhibit speech .... ); Steven J. Horowitz, A Free
Speech Theory of Copyright, 2009 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2, 1 7 ("In short, the copyright system enables
pervasive restrictions on speech."); David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright
Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1393, 1396 (2009) (noting the "restrictions on speech that
copyright owners impose by charging for copies of their works, or even withholding their works");
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, I 14 Yale L.J. 535, 537 (2004) ("[C]opying may sometimes be an instance of free speech
even when it is also copyright infringement.").
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in 1970 by Professor Melville Nimmer.221 Although cognizant of the tension
between copyright law and free speech, Nimmer concluded that copyright's
internal "safety valves," particularly the idea-expression dichotomy (and, to a
lesser extent, the limited duration of copyright terms), largely defuse potential
222 223
conflicts with the First Amendment. Many disagreed. It took nearly thirty
years, however, for scholars to recognize one particularly problematic
application of copyright law in light of the reconceptualization of copyright as a
224
speech restriction-the area of preliminary injunctions.
Professors Lemley and Volokh offer a compelling argument that the
constitutional-law doctrine condemning prior restraints on speech should apply
to copyright law, rendering the grant of preliminary injunctions in copyright-
infringement lawsuits frequently violative of the First Amendment. 2 5 Courts,
however, have been loath to apply direct free-speech scrutiny to copyrights.
Those that have addressed even the possibility of a conflict have tended to
dismiss it.2 2 6 The same goes for courts that have directly addressed the argument
that copyright preliminary injunctions are, or at least can be, unconstitutional
prior restraints.227 As Professor Goldstein has noted, the free-speech critique of
221 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970).
222 Id. at 1192-96.
223 See, e.g., Christina Bohanran, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 Wash U. L. Rev.
969, 990 (2007) ("[A]llowing a copyright owner to suppress criticism or expression of a different
viewpoint would be detrimental to First Amendment interests."); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 37-48 (2001) (arguing that courts
should apply First Amendment scrutiny to copyright law as a "content-neutral" speech regulation); L.
Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1987) (contending that
the evolution of modem copyright law, particularly the "corruption" of the fair-use defense, "created a
conflict between copyright and free speech rights").
224 The article in which the possibility was broached is Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Law, by Professors Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh. See Lemley & Volokh,
supra note 5.
225 Id.
226 Goldstein, supra note 60, § 12.3, at 12:76. But see Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd.,
996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that First Amendment protections might come into play in
an "extraordinary" case).
227 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books, 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 n.l 1(9th Cir. 1997) ("We
reject outright [the defendants'] claim that the injunction in this case constitutes a prior restraint in
violation of free speech guaranteed by the United States Constitution."); see also Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns
Int'l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("Those [free-speech] challenges [to copyright
law] that are made have been summarily dismissed."). Perhaps the most oft-quoted argument in favor
of this position is the Fifth Circuit's statement that "[t]he first amendment is not a license to trammel
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copyright law has amounted to "a tempest in a very small teapot." 228 At least one
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has given serious credence to the argument,
holding that the issuance of a preliminary injunction violated "the shared
principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior
restraint on speech .... ."229
I argue that at least part of what the U.S. Supreme Court attempted in eBay
was to forestall an inevitable conflict between copyright preliminary injunctions
and the prior-restraint doctrine. To lay the groundwork for this proposition, a
brief discussion of the doctrine forbidding prior restraints on speech, as well as a
short summary of Lemley and Volokh's argument that it should apply to
copyright law, follows. I then turn to the Court's current position regarding the
interplay between the First Amendment and copyright law, embodied by its oft-
cited "traditional contours" statement in Eldred v. Ashcroft,230 to shed new light
on the eBay opinion. In the final section of Part IV, I begin by analyzing and
partially rejecting the argument that the prior-restraint doctrine should apply in
copyright law, then propose an alteration to the current spectrum of speech
restrictions that would account for the unique nature of copyrights. I conclude by
evaluating whether the Court's approach can offer a satisfactory means for courts
deciding copyright cases to avoid violating the principles embodied in the First
Amendment.
1. The Prior Restraint Doctrine and Copyright Law
There is no idea more central to free-speech jurisprudence than that so-
called "prior restraints" on speech are contrary to the freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution. A "prior restraint" is essentially a restriction of speech prior to its
dissemination.231 As early as 1907, the Court recognized that preventing
"previous restraints" on speech was central to the aims of the First
Amendment; 232 antecedent state supreme courts interpreting similar provisions
233had reached the same conclusion as early as 1788. In fact, it was not until 1919
on legally recognized rights in intellectual property." Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Scoreboard Poster, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979).
228 Goldstein, supra note 60, § 12.3, at 12:76.
229 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
230 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
231 Black's Law Dictionary 1232 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "prior restraint" as "[a] governmental
restriction on speech or publication before its actual expression.").
232 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
233 Respublica v. Oswald, I Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788) (freedom of the press); see also Commonwealth
v. Blanding, 20 Mass.304, 313-14 (Mass. 1825).
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that the Court directed First Amendment scrutiny toward any speech restriction
other than a prior restraint.234 Thus, it has become widely accepted that prior
restraints are "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights." 235 A heavy presumption of unconstitutionality attaches to all
such restraints,236 and the Court has repeatedly overturned them as a result. 23 7
To take a step back for a moment, 2 3 8 under the U.S. Constitution, all speech
might be said to fall into one of two categories: it is either "protected" by the
First Amendment, in which case it cannot be constitutionally restrained, or
11 239
"unprotected," in which case it can. Speech that is "obscene," for instance, has
been deemed to fall outside the umbrella of First Amendment protection.24 0
While the Court has arguably retreated from a strictly categorical approach to
defining what constitutes "protected" or "unprotected" speech, 241 this general
dichotomy remains in effect.
Within the realm of copyright law also exists speech that is protected and
speech that is unprotected. In Harper & Row, the Court touched upon this
distinction in rejecting the defendant's claim that its use of copyrighted material
pertaining to a matter of great public concern implicated the First Amendment.242
234 The Court, in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), f1rst recognized the possibility of a less
narrowly confined First Amendment, stating: "It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the
main purpose ..... Id. at 51-52.
235 Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
236 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."); N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (quoting Bantam Books for the
same proposition).
237 E.g., Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70-72 (holding that Rhode Island's creation of a "Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth," which essentially functioned to censor publications it deemed
objectionable, was an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech).
238 This discussion owes a heavy debt to I Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of
Speech (2009).
239 See generally Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("[F]reedom of speech, though
not absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil . . . ." (citation omitted)).
240 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("[T]he primary requirements of decency may be
enforced against obscene publications."); cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952)
("[[It is not necessary for us to decide . . . whether a state may . . . prevent the showing of obscene
films. That is a very different question from the one now before us." (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 716)).
241 Smolla, supra note 238, § 2:70, at 2-69 (contending that the Court has abandoned a "mechanical"
approach to classifying speech as protected or unprotected).
242 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1985).
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The Court identified two internal copyright doctrines, the idea-expression
dichotomy and fair use, as "First Amendment protections." 2 4 3 The distinction
between uncopyrightable "ideas" and copyrightable "expressions" emerged as a
particularly attractive tool for serving this function. Since an author cannot
copyright her ideas (or, in the same vein, facts she has discovered), the Court
reasoned, the Copyright Act allows the "free flow of information" 244 that is at
the heart of the First Amendment. Thus, direct copying of another's expression
that does not qualify as a fair use is "unprotected" speech; it may therefore be
constitutionally restricted.
A simple hypothetical illustrates the operation of this logic. Jane Smith
reads Engels' Anti-Dilhring, which is (again, hypothetically) still protected by
the U.S. Copyright Act. 2 4 5 Greatly impressed with the tenets of socialism, Jane
decides to set pen to paper to express her newfound love for all things Engelsian.
In doing so, she may express some of the very same ideas Engels espoused-for
example, his argument that capitalist production systems, and not just
distribution systems, ought to be rejected-in a different manner than Engels
used, yet her work will absolutely be protected by the First Amendment. If,
however, Jane is so enraptured with Engels' prose that she decides to merely
copy and paste it neatly into her own "work," her speech likely loses its
protected status,246 and a court could constitutionally hold her liable for
copyright infringement. The First Amendment's concern in promoting the
uninhibited flow of information is not harmed by this dynamic, for Jane remains
free to re-word the idea and publish her work. Furthermore, even if Jane decides
the hassle of creating original expression is not worth it and gives up her dream
of publishing, the public is none the worse off-we are still left with Engels'
original.
All of that is fairly uncontroversial, at least in practice (if not in theory).247
It would seem that scholars could line up copyright infringement alongside other
243 Id. at 560.
244 Id. at 558 (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
245 Anti-Dilhring having been published in the latter half of the nineteenth century, this is (of course)
not the case in reality.
246 Putting aside the possibility that Jane's use is "transformative" enough to qualify as a fair use. See
generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (placing heavy weight on the
degree of "transformativeness" embodied by the defendant's work in deciding whether to hold that the
work constitutes a fair use of the plaintiffs copyrighted work).
247 Not all scholars would agree. Rebecca Tushnet, for example, argues that naked copying itself
"serves multiple speech values." Tushnet, supra note 220, at 546.
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such unprotected "exceptions" to the First Amendment (e.g., obscenity2 4 8). Here,
however, is where the prior-restraint problem arises. As Professors Lemley and
249Volokh note, even though obscenity is unprotected speech, the constitutional
concern with protecting the right to speak is so great that the Court has erected
the prior-restraint doctrine as a prophylactic guard against possible restrictions of
protected (i.e., non-obscene) speech.250 Similarly, although libelous speech may
be constrained or punished after a full adjudication determining that the speech
in question is, in fact, libelous, the rule forbidding prior restraints still protects
libel defendants during the interlocutory phase of litigation.25  Copyright
defendants, however, receive no such protection,25 despite the overwhelming
likelihood that, in at least some cases, an erroneously granted preliminary
253injunction will silence their protected speech. This is the aberration around
which Lemley and Volokh centered their argument. 254 They ultimately
concluded that, in copyright-infringement cases, preliminary injunctions quite
frequently act as unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.25 5
248 Smolla, supra note 238, § 2:7 1, at 2-71.
249 While Lemley and Volokh view obscenity as merely one of an "unprotected" class of speech
categories, Smolla's treatise argues otherwise, generally taking the view that the Court is abandoning
category-based distinctions in its free-speech jurisprudence. See id. ("The one class of speech from
Chaplinsky that continues to be treated as outside of the First Amendment is "obscene speech.").
25o Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 173-74.
251 See id. at 149.
252 But see SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (1lth Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
issuance of the [preliminary] injunction was at odds with the shared principles of the First Amendment
and the copyright law, acting as a prior restraint on speech . . . .").
253 This likelihood exists because of the requirement that copyright plaintiffs prove only a "likelihood"
of success on the merits-the converse, of course, is the likelihood that (given the undeveloped factual
record) courts sometimes grant preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs who would ultimately have lost at
trial. Where the defendant would have ultimately prevailed by invoking the idea-expression defense, it
would follow that the preliminary injunction acted as a prior restraint on her constitutionally protected
speech.
254 It should be noted that, as does this Article, Professors Lemley and Volokh focused on preliminary
(not permanent) injunctions. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 170. As they noted, permanent
injunctions (having followed a "final determination that the speech is unprotected") do not raise the
specter of the prior-restraint doctrine. Id.
255 See generally id. at 241 ("We believe that under the Court's prior restraint jurisprudence many
intellectual property preliminary injunctions are therefore unconstitutional.").
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2. The "Traditional Contours" Approach to Saving
Copyright's Constitutionality
Despite the intellectual appeal of such arguments, courts have generally
tended to reject invitations to apply direct First Amendment scrutiny to the
Copyright Act.256 This reluctance is understandable-for a variety of reasons,
engaging in such an exercise would be quite problematic. 257 In 2003, however,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft gave lower courts and legal
scholars a glimpse-the first in almost twenty years2 58f its view on how the
First Amendment and copyright law may coexist peacefully. 259 In Eldred, the
Court initially noted that, given the close temporal proximity between the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution (which grants Congress the power to enact
copyright laws 26 0) and the passage of the First Amendment, 261 the Framers must
262have conceived of the two as compatible. Since copyright law is designed to
256 Goldstein, supra note 60, § 12.3, at 12:76 ("Most courts that have addressed the [conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment] have summarily dismissed the possibility of any such conflict.").
But see SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1277 (holding that a preliminary injunction violated "the shared
principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law"); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns. Int'l,
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that First Amendment concerns might supersede
copyright's internal free-speech safeguards (here, the fair-use defense) in an "extraordinary" case).
257 Perhaps most notably, copyright law does not seem to fit the paradigmatic suppression of free
speech contemplated by the First Amendment, for it suppresses some speech in order to encourage the
speech of others. Thus, the Copyright Act seems to be, at the very least, an unusual candidate for direct
First Amendment scrutiny. See David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate
Copyright Policy, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 281, 300-01 (2004) ("[S]etting the First Amendment against
copyright produces a conflict between speech interests, rather than between speech and some other
interest, such as reputation or order. The First Amendment does not provide premises that can resolve
such conflicts.").
258 The last case addressing, albeit briefly, the intersection of the two bodies of law was Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). There, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's
view that "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression."' Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 556 (alteration in original) (quoting
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
259 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
260 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. (giving Congress the power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries").
261 The Constitution was adopted in 1787; the Bill of Rights (containing the First Amendment) was
ratified four years later, in 1791.
262 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 ("[I]n the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible
with free speech principles.").
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advance free expression, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, the two are not as inapposite
as they may appear,26 although it would be overreaching to hold that copyrights
are categorically immune from First Amendment challenges.264 Thus, the Court
adopted the "traditional contours" approach to saving copyright's
constitutionality, stating that "when . . . Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is
unnecessary." 265 This reasoning seems fairly sound-broadly speaking, the
Framers probably viewed the First Amendment and copyright laws as capable of
peaceful coexistence, particularly given that the Bill of Rights was enacted only
one year after the first Copyright Act.
Of course, actually unearthing just what the "traditional contours" of
copyright were may be problematic-copyright law has changed a great deal in
the two hundred-plus years of its existence.2 66 Witness, for instance, the
breathtaking increase in the length of copyright terms. Narrowly speaking, the
traditional-contours argument appears somewhat flawed in this regard. While it
may stand to reason that U.S. copyright law, as originally conceived, did not
encroach on the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the same
holds true today. On the contrary, given the considerable expansion of copyright
protections over the past two centuries,267 the Eldred Court's approach-based as
it is on the premise that "First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary" when
"Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection"-
would appear problematic, for (at least under a narrow understanding) Congress
has clearly done so. The Court, however, appears instead to have taken a fairly
266broad view of copyright's traditional contours, one that is focused on
263 Id.
264 Id. at 221 (rejecting the lower court's statement to that effect in Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.2d 372, 376
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
265 Id.
266 Compare II Stat. 138 (1856) (adding public performance right in dramatic works), with 29 Stat.
481 (1897) (same for musical works), and 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909) (same for works prepared for
oral delivery), and 66 Stat. 752 (1952) (same for nondramatic literary works).
267 The First Amendment's sphere of protection has, of course, correspondingly expanded since its
inception, further increasing the potential for a collision between the two. Aaron Perzanowski,
Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 833, 851 n.122 (2006).
268 If this were not the case, it would strain the imagination to hold that the Copyright Term Extension
Act ("CTEA") at issue in Eldred was within these traditional contours. The original Copyright Act,
passed in 1790, set the term limits of copyrights at fourteen years, renewable once for another fourteen
years. See I Stat. 124 (1790). In comparison, the CTEA extended copyright protection to the author's
entire lifespan, plus an additional seventy years post mortem. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
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preserving copyright's core principles and internal safeguards. The core principle
identified by the Eldred is that copyright law exists to "spur[] the creation and
publication of new expression."2 69 It also noted the internal speech safeguards
embedded in copyright jurisprudence: the idea-expression dichotomy and the
fair-use defense.270 Thus, while extending the length of copyrights or adding a
derivative-works right does alter the "traditional contours" of copyright
protections in a narrowly read sense of the phrase, it does not do so in the way
the Eldred Court contemplated.
The "traditional contours" approach, adopted by the Eldred Court just three
years before eBay was decided, may offer the only satisfactory explanation for
the eBay Court's reliance on its shaky copyright-law analogy. 2 7 1 Recall that in
eBay, the Court referred to the four-factor test as the "traditional" test,2 7 2 part of
the "well-established principles of equity." 273 It then alluded to the notion that
these "traditional principles of equity" historically governed how courts treated
injunctions under the Copyright Act,274 which is (at the very least)
questionable.275 The Court, however, may very well have been referring to the
broader notion that copyright injunctions should not issue "automatically," 2 7 6 but
instead should be issued only in "extraordinary" cases, a proposition more in line
277
with the "traditional contours" of courts' treatment of copyright law. It seems
at least plausible, then, that the eBay Court's repeated references to "traditional"
278
equitable principles were in fact an attempt to draw the four-factor test for
injunctive relief (and, more generally speaking, a higher bar for copyright
plaintiffs seeking such relief) into the "traditional contours" of copyright law.
Whether universal application of the four-factor test can avoid First
Amendment conflicts, however, will depend largely on how courts decide to
apply it. Taking into account the combined weight of eBay and Winter, the Court
has strongly indicated that the preliminary injunction is a remedy best used
269 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
270 Id.
271 See supra notes 259, 262-65, 269-70 and accompanying text.
272 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
21 Id. at 391.
274 Id. at 392 ("This approach is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright
Act.").
275 See supra notes 52, 219 and accompanying text.
276 Indeed, that proposition might be characterized as the core (albeit vague) holding of eBay.
277 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
278 Including both concurring opinions, the eBay Court used the word "traditional" a total of twelve
times.
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sparingly, after careful consideration of each individual tine of the four-factor
test. Should courts follow this tenet, the percentage of cases in which preliminary
injunctions are granted-particularly in copyright lawsuits, wherein such relief
has traditionally been available almost as of right-should decrease.
Furthermore, as suggested above, this trend strongly suggests that courts should
do away with the presumption of irreparable harm, as well as the "presumptions"
that the balance of hardships and public interest always favor copyright plaintiffs
(and granting injunctions).279 Again, requiring copyright plaintiffs to demonstrate
these factors will almost certainly reduce the number of preliminary injunctions
granted.280 There is a difference, however, between alleviating the number of
potential First Amendment violations and entirely accounting for their
possibility. 2 8' The following section explores how the four-factor test, as a newly
minted part of the "traditional contours" of copyright law, can allow courts to do
just that.
3. Can It Work? Balancing the Interests and the Public-Interest
Inquiry of the Four-Factor Test
Given that courts have been so reluctant to apply direct First Amendment
scrutiny to copyright law, it is extremely unlikely that they will choose to apply
the prior-restraint doctrine to requests for preliminary injunctions in copyright-
infringement cases. The argument that the doctrine should so apply has
theoretical appeal, but little realistic likelihood of succeeding in the courts.
Instead, application of the four-factor standard announced in eBay and reiterated
279 See supra notes 65-68, 92 and accompanying text.
280 As noted above, courts rarely even considered these factors in the past. Any attention given them
would hold a substantially likelihood of a reduction in the overall number of preliminary injunctions
granted. Take the balance-of-hardships inquiry, for example. The platitude that the balance of
hardships always tips in favor of the plaintiff (for her copyright is being infringed) seems glaringly
unsound-why should a copyright plaintiff be any different from other plaintiffs? Certainly, some
copyright holders would suffer no great harm should a preliminary injunction be refused. In the case of
complementary works (such as, arguably, the sequel to Catcher in the Rye enjoined in Salinger v.
Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)), the grant of a preliminary injunction would actually
harm the plaintiffby reducing sales of her copyrighted work. Since it would also harm the defendant
(by eliminating her potential profits), the balance of hardships in such a case would seem clearly to tip
in favor of denying the injunction.
281 So as not to denigrate the advantages inherent in any reduction in the number of preliminary
injunctions issued, it bears reiterating that such a reduction-particularly in the injunction-happy field
of copyright law-will likely create benefits not only from a free-speech perspective, but also from the
standpoint of maximizing social utility.
368
SPRING 2011 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW VOL.10:2
in Winter, will-and should-become widespread. Thus, from a practical
standpoint, the question becomes how best to apply the four-factor standard to
account for the possibility of harming First Amendment values.
From the First Amendment perspective, the interests at stake are (1)
cultivating a thriving marketplace of ideas and (2) protecting speakers' personal
integrity.282 The interest copyright law sought to serve is, of course, identified in
,,283
the Constitution: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. As
the Court has stated: "[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of
free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas." 284 The similarity this goal bears to the marketplace-of-ideas free-speech
interest is striking. And the Court has stated that the personal-integrity interest
bears less heavily in copyright-infringement litigation,28 5 further simplifying the
task of balancing. Conflict between copyright preliminary injunctions and the
First Amendment could be mitigated by weighing two competing concerns: (1)
any harm to the defendant's personal-integrity interest caused by granting the
preliminary injunction, and (2) whether granting the injunction would promote
progress in the marketplace of ideas.
The Court has stated that "[t]he First Amendment securely protects the
freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches." 28 6 Given this,
and taking into account that the purpose of copyright law's grant of exclusive
rights to authors is supposed to be promoting progress, it would seem that the
balance of the interests would quite frequently favor granting plaintiffs
preliminary injunctions. This is not necessarily the case, however, for two
reasons.
First, use of others' speech can take place to a variety of degrees. At one
end lies direct, extensive, noncreative copying-here, the second clause in
Court's statement appears more relevant, for here (at least in one sense) the
copier is asserting "the right to make other people's speeches." 287 At the other
extreme lies copying a minimal amount of material that is incorporated into an
282 See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
283 U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
284 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
285 See supra notes 195-96, 214-15, 222-23 and accompanying text. Many scholars, of course, would
not agree.
286 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
287 Id.
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otherwise highly original work. Here, the copying seems more likely to implicate
the statement's first clause-that "[t]he First Amendment securely protects the
freedom to make . . . one's own speech." 2 88 The more transformative an allegedly
infringing work is, the more heavily the downstream user's speech interest is
implicated.28 9
Second, copyright law may not always promote progress. In fact, in certain
areas (for example, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works), it may fail to
do so with some frequency. 290 Furthermore, a preliminary injunction may not
always be necessary to uphold the Copyright Act or further the interests the Act
is designed to effectuate-it is merely one remedy allowable under the Act.291
Quite likely, in at least some cases, an award of damages would be a perfectly
sufficient redress.29 2 Finally, even in cases where granting the injunction would
promote progress to some degree, cases may very well arise wherein denying the
injunction would do even more to further progress in the marketplace of ideas.
Take, for instance, the example of an author who has steadfastly refused to
license either his copyrighted work or the right to prepare derivatives of it, and
288 Id.
289 See Samuelson & Bebenek, supra note 211, at 90-91 ("Insofar as transformative and non-
transformative use of speech interests lie along a spectrum, the speech interest of follow-on creators
will typically increase as these uses becomes [sic] more transformative and the creative contribution of
the second creators is more extensive."). It is worth noting that, the further toward the transformative
end of the spectrum a defendant's work lies, the greater the probability that it constitutes a "fair use"
of the copyrighted work. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
("The central purpose of [the fair-use] investigation is to see ... whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative."' (quoting Pierre N. Laval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
1105, 1111 (1990))). Thus, the fair-use doctrine, part of copyright law's "built-in First Amendment
accommodations," Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219, can assist here in safeguarding speech interests-since
success on the merits is unlikely to the extent a defendant establishes a viable fair use defense, a
plaintiff would not be able to satisfy that prong of the four-factor test. As a result, preliminary
injunctions will not issue in such cases.
290 See, e.g., John M. Newman, Note, Holden Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v. Colting, the Promotion-
of-Progress Requirement, and Market Failure in a Derivative-Works Regime, 96 Iowa L. Rev.
(forthcoming, 2011).
291 See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006). Other remedies allowed by the Act include permanent injunctions,
ordering the impounding and disposition of infringing articles, under § 503(a)(1)(AHC), and damages
(either actual or statutory), under § 504(a).
292 For instance, cases involving direct copying of a work with a readily ascertainable market, wherein
the defendant appears unlikely to continue infringement post-trial, a damages award would be easily
calculable; better, by making the plaintiff whole, it would not disturb the ex ante incentive structure of
copyright law-all while avoiding the risk of unconstitutionality associated with prior restraints.
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has stated that he will never prepare his own derivative work.2 93 A secondary
author then prepares a derivative work that draws enough from the original to
constitute infringement, yet the derivative also includes a fair amount of the
secondary author's original expression. In such a case, where the Copyright
Act's derivative-works right does not seem to effect copyright law's
constitutionally mandated purpose, denying the injunction would almost
certainly further the shared values of copyright law and free-speech to a greater
extent than would enjoining the secondary work-it would leave the public with
two works where there would otherwise have been only one. Thus, although
balancing the interests in copyright lawsuits requesting preliminary injunctions
may frequently favor promoting progress in the marketplace of ideas over the
personal-integrity speech interest of the defendant, it will not always favor
granting the injunction itself. Most importantly, this balancing-of-interests
inquiry would assist in accounting for potential First Amendment violations,
rather than merely reducing their quantity.
The Court's four-factor test is uniquely well-situated to allow for the
application of such an inquiry. Unlike the approaches used by the Ninth Circuit
(and, until recently, the Second Circuit), the four-factor test applied in Winter
and eBay mandates that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
294demonstrate that the public interest favors granting the injunction. The first
three factors are logically related; they serve the essential function of a
preliminary injunction-"to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a
meaningful trial on the merits can be held." 2 95 The first factor, irreparable harm
to the plaintiff absent interlocutory injunctive relief, ensures that granting the
injunction is necessary (given the availability of other remedies, such as
damages). The second two, likelihood of success on the merits and a favorable
balance of hardships, create a sort of algebraic formula for determining when a
preliminary injunction is appropriate.296 Thus, the judge must weigh how likely
29 This fact pattern is drawn from the case of Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
294 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
295 Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
296 In his Economic Analysis of the Law, Posner states the formula thus: "Grant [a preliminary
injunction] if but only if P(Hp) > (I - P)Hd. . . . P represents the plaintiff's likelihood of success; Hp
is the amount of irreparable harm plaintiff will suffer absent relief; (I - P) denotes the defendant's
likelihood of success; and Hd is the amount of harm a defendant will suffer if the injunction issues.
Posner, supra note 24, § 21.3, at 595.
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the plaintiff is to succeed against the probability and magnitude of harm that will
be suffered by both parties-the respective harms that would be inflicted on a
wrongfully enjoined defendant or on a wrongfully denied plaintiff.
These first three factors operate on an internal level; the relevant concerns
are those of the parties in the instant case. The fourth factor, which requires
consideration of the public interest, is analytically separate from the first three.
The scope of relevant interests under a public-interest inquiry is broader than the
scope of the other three factors; the public-interests factor is-unlike the other
three factors-not focused on preserving a meaningful trial on the merits. In fact,
whether the injunction would serve the interest of the public has little or nothing
to do with that aim. As a result, the public-interest factor provides a workable
conduit for applying the balancing-of-interests test described above. The
interests of copyright law and the First Amendment necessarily emerge as the
predominant public interests in a request for a preliminary injunction against
copyright infringement, and these twin aims should be balanced under the
public-interest inquiry-the fourth factor announced by the Court in eBay and
Winter-in order to preserve the constitutionality of the Copyright Act.
C. The New Standard: How Future Courts Should
Apply the Four-Factor Test
As an initial matter, courts applying the four-factor test should lay the
burden of proving all four factors on the plaintiff.297 With regards to the first
factor, whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary
injunctive relief, it seems clear that courts should do away with the currently
prevalent presumption of irreparable harm. In addition to the concerns noted
above, where the plaintiff will suffer no irreparable harm absent a preliminary
injunction, a court granting her the injunction runs the risk of unnecessarily
harming the defendant's speech interests. Furthermore, presuming harm impairs
the role played by the first three factors, i.e., ensuring that injunctions issue only
where necessary in order to preserve a meaningful trial on the merits. 298 For
similar reasons, courts should reject the position that the balance-of-hardships
factor always favors granting preliminary injunctions to copyright plaintiffs.
With regards to the second factor, likelihood of success on the merits, it
should be noted that defendants' speech interests, while relatively minimal, are
297 See, e.g., Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 ("A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [the
four factors].").
298 See Patry, supra note 8, § 22.10, at 22-38 (refuting the preserving-the-status-quo approach and
arguing that preliminary injunctions serve instead to preserve a meaningful trial on the merits).
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still of great import.299 The importance of all free-speech values, as evidenced by
the heightened levels of scrutiny and procedural safeguards (such as the prior-
restraint rule) characteristic of First Amendment jurisprudence, is strong in any
case that carries a likelihood of erroneously restraining protected speech. Thus, a
copyright-preliminary-injunction regime that deals effectively with First
Amendment interests should require at least a reasonable degree of likelihood of
success in lieu of a trial on the merits. The sufficiently-serious-questions test,
never of great value, should be discarded entirely. 300 A greater-than-fifty-percent
standard would seem a logical replacement, given that it is the same standard to
which a plaintiff is held in proving her case at trial. Thus, while some chance of
erroneously restraining protected (i.e., uninfringing) speech remains, such a
standard would serve far more effectively than a mere sufficiently-serious-
questions requirement. This middle-ground approach also would seem befitting,
given copyright's unique status in First Amendment law. It is also worth noting
that the few courts bold enough to quantify this factor have fixed the requirement
such that plaintiffs must demonstrate a greater-than-fifty-percent chance of
301
success.
Finally, courts should do away with the "presumption" that the public
interest always favors granting preliminary injunctions to copyright plaintiffs,
and instead engage in the balancing approach outlined above. The often-cited
rationale for applying the presumption, that "the public interest is always served
,302 303
by upholding copyrights," is questionable at best. Worse, it is frustratingly
enthymematic; it omits the necessary minor premise: "Granting preliminary
injunctions always upholds copyrights." Stated as such, the argument reveals its
fallacious nature-even granting that "the public interest is always served by
upholding copyrights," it does not follow that preliminary injunctions are always
necessary to uphold copyrights. Preliminary injunctive relief is but one remedy
available to courts. Due to the risks uniquely inherent in preliminary injunctions,
courts should not grant them unless necessary. Furthermore, as noted above, it is
299 Smolla, supra note 238.
3 See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
301 See supra note 72-74, 81 and accompanying text.
302 See, e.g., Janel Russell Designs, Inc. v. Mendelson & Assocs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 857, 861 (D.
Minn. 2000); Signcad Tech. Corp. v. Signcad Sys., Inc., No. Civ. 02-4786(JRT/FLN), 2003 WL
465801, at *6 (D. Minn. 2003).
303 See generally Newman, supra note 290 (arguing that the Copyright Act's grant of an exclusive
derivative-works right frequently fails to fulfill copyright's utilitarian goal, rendering it frequently
unconstitutional as a result).
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simply not the case that the relevant public interests always favor granting
preliminary injunctions. Instead of uniformly finding that this factor favors
copyright plaintiffs, courts should balance the relevant interests-the shared
interest in promoting progress in the marketplace of ideas, as well as the
defendant's personal-integrity interest in speaking-to determine whether
injunctive relief is appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the conflict between the First Amendment and copyright law is
certainly larger than the potential prior-restraint problem identified by Professors
Lemley and Volokh, the possibility of erroneously silencing protected speech on
an undeveloped factual record presents a particularly serious concern.
Meanwhile, the costs to society of handing out preliminary injunctions to
copyright plaintiffs as a matter of course should give jurists (at the very least)
great pause.
The Court, in handing down its eBay and Winter decisions, appears to have
attempted two primary goals. The first, reducing the overall number of
preliminary injunctions issued, arises from the standpoint of social utility-it
seeks to address the problematic over-application, seemingly endemic to
copyright law, of such a coercive remedy. Universal implementation of the four-
factor test, likely to occur in the near future, will go some distance toward
achieving this goal. However, doing away with the copyright-specific
presumptions (both dejure and defacto) that reduce the four-factor inquiry to a
one-factor test is an essential element of following the spirit of the Court's recent
holdings-and of affecting its aim.
The second, avoiding conflicts between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act, cannot be achieved merely by a wholesale reduction in the
number of injunctions issued, regardless of whether such a reduction is
accomplished under the "traditional contours" mantle. In a perfect world, at least
as envisioned by most modem copyright scholars, perhaps courts would apply
direct First Amendment scrutiny to copyright law. Given that the traditional-
contours approach is a practical reality, however, courts must consider how best
to serve the interests embodied in both the Copyright Act and the First
Amendment. Fortunately, the public-interest inquiry under the Court's four-
factor test provides an excellent avenue for courts to account for free-speech
concerns by balancing copyright and free-speech values.
3 See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
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The reality of copyright preliminary injunctions still diverges sharply from
the judicial rhetoric surrounding them. By universally applying the four-factor
test within the analytical framework described above, however, the two may yet
be realigned. Perhaps more importantly, the very same framework can allow for
ensuring both the furtherance of copyright law's core aim, the promotion of
progress, and the continued protection of one of our most cherished liberties-
the freedom of speech.
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